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Evolutionary Game Theory (EGT) has become an attractive framework for
modeling human behavior because it provides tools to explicitly model the dynam-
ics of behaviors in populations over time and does not require the strong rationality
assumptions of classical game theory. Since the application of EGT to human be-
havior is still relatively new, many questions about human behavior and culture of
interest to social scientists have yet to be examined through an EGT perspective
to determine whether explanatory and predictive rather than merely descriptive
insights can be gained. In this thesis, informed by social science data and under
close collaboration with social scientists, I use EGT-based approaches to model
and gain a qualitative understanding of various aspects of the evolution of human
decision-making and culture. The specific phenomena I explore are i) risk prefer-
ences and their implications on the evolution of cooperation and ii) the relationship
between societal threat and the propensity with which agents of societies punish
norm-violating behavior.
First, inspired by much empirical research that shows human risk-preferences
to be state-dependent rather than expected-value-maximizing, I propose a simple
sequential lottery game framework to study the evolution of human risk preferences.
Using this game model in conjunction with known population dynamics provides the
novel insight that for a large range of population dynamics, the interplay between
risk-taking and sequentiality of choices allows state-dependent risk behavior to have
an evolutionary advantage over expected-value maximization. I then demonstrate
how this principle can facilitate the evolution of cooperation in classic game-theoretic
games where cooperation entails risk.
Next, inspired by striking differences across cultural groups in their willingness
to punish norm violators, I develop evolutionary game models based on the Pub-
lic Goods Game to study punishment behavior. Operationalizing various forms of
societal threat and determining the relationship between these threats and evolved
punishment propensities, these models show how cross-cultural differences in pun-
ishment behavior are at least partially determined by cultures’ exposure to societal
threats, providing support for social science theories hypothesizing that higher threat
is a causal factor for higher punishment propensities.
This work advances the state of the art of EGT and its applications to the
social sciences by i) creating novel EGT models to study different phenomena of
interest in human decision-making and culture, and ii) using these models to pro-
vide insights about the relationships between variables in these models and their
impact on evolutionary outcomes. By developing and analyzing these models under
close consideration of relevant social science data, this work not only advances our
understanding of how to use evolutionary game and multi-agent system models to
study social phenomena, but also lays the foundation for more complex explanatory
and predictive tools applicable to behaviors in human populations.
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In this thesis, I employ evolutionary game theoretic approaches that combine
theoretical analysis and multi-agent system simulations to generate models of the
evolution of various phenomena relating to human decision-making and culture.
Following its original conception to study problems in evolutionary biology, Evo-
lutionary Game Theory (EGT) has become an increasingly common tool used to
model, explain, and predict phenomena of human behavior and societies. EGT is
an attractive framework under which to model human behavior because it allows
for the explicit modeling of changes in behaviors and norms over time based in a
manner that is dependent on other behaviors in the population. Also, the social-
science literature is filled with examples of empirical studies showing that humans
violate the strong rationality assumptions of classical game theory. Under the EGT
framework, such an assumption of a priori rational agents is not required.
This thesis advances the state of the art of evolutionary game theory and its
applications to the social sciences by i) developing novel evolutionary game theoretic
models to study different specific phenomena of interest in human behavior and
culture that have not yet been explored in this manner, and ii) providing novel
observations about the relationships between variables in these evolutionary game
theoretic models and their impact on evolutionary outcomes, thereby providing new
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insights into the evolution of human decision-making behavior, social norms and
culture.
Specifically, the models presented in this thesis show how a large range of
population dynamics that model social imitation learning result in state-dependent
risk preferences under sequential choice, how this principle facilitates the evolution
of cooperation in classic game theoretic games where cooperation entails risk, and
lastly how cross-cultural differences in punishment behavior to enforce cooperative
norms are at least partially determined by cultures exposure to societal threats.
These investigations are motivated and carried out under the close consideration of
relevant social science data. The development and analysis of evolutionary game
theoretic models of these aspects of human behavior and culture not only advances
our understanding of how to use evolutionary game and multi-agent system models
to study such problems, but also lays the foundation for more complex explanatory
and predictive tools applicable to human populations and societies.
1.1 Motivation, Aim and Approach
Many questions about human behavior and culture of interest to social scien-
tists have yet to be examined through an evolutionary game theoretic perspective
in order to determine whether explanatory and predictive rather than merely de-
scriptive insights can be gained. The primary goal of my evolutionary game theo-
retic models is to enhance our understanding of human behaviors and societies by
shedding light on the relationships of various environmental factors and adaptation
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(social learning) processes to evolutionary behavioral outcomes and dynamics. This
research is grounded in empirical social science data and conducted in close interdis-
ciplinary collaboration with social scientists. Such an interdisciplinary approach is
often crucial for the validity and usefulness of evolutionary game theoretic models.
Integrating evolutionary game theoretic models into social science can provide
a complementary method to those that exist in the field. In order to understand
our complex human social world, social scientists often create descriptive models of
human behavior and decision making. Based on empirical data, these studies seek
primarily to describe observed behavior rather than to understand their underlying
dynamics and reasons for emergence. Similarly, empirical studies often find cor-
relations among various historical, socio-cultural, and behavioral factors in human
populations. However, no causal relationships in these correlations can be deter-
mined. By providing explanatory models of the emergence of different observed
behaviors, evolutionary game theoretic models have the ability to describe the pro-
cess and dynamics under which different behaviors emerge, and establish support for
causal relationships among socio-cultural, historical, and behavioral factors that are
often difficult or impossible to test or infer empirically. Furthermore, such models
can be used to test hypothetical scenarios and to create predictive tools of human
behavior and population norms.
Throughout the development of the evolutionary game theoretic models pre-
sented in this thesis, I used mathematical analysis and multi-agent system simu-
lations in a symbiotic fashion. Simulations can be used as an exploratory tool to
inspire theoretical investigations, to validate theoretical predictions, or to produce
3
results when the model is too complex to meaningfully analyze mathematically.
In return, when possible and useful, mathematical analyses serve to formalize the
dynamics and relationships in the presented models and validate simulation results.
1.2 Evolutionary Game Theory
Generally, Lewontin [62] and Maynard-Smith [69] are credited with the pio-
neering of evolutionary game theory and its application in biological contexts. They
recognized that the fitness of an organism (and hence its genes) is dependent on
the abundance of other organisms in the environment (termed frequency-dependent
fitness), and this fact critically influenced the evolution of biological species, genes,
and traits. In addition to biological genetic inheritance, however, the evolution-
ary process can also be treated as an analogy to the processes of learning [43] and
the cultural transmission and change of memes, behaviors, and norms in human
societies [27, 17]. In this context, strategies do not correspond to different genes
or species, but behaviors. The concept of frequency-dependent fitness undoubtedly
plays a crucial role in the evolution of human behaviors and norms, since the fitness
of a behavior of any one individual depends on the abundance and types of others’
behaviors and norms in the population.
Thus, following its original conception to study problems in evolutionary bi-
ology, EGT has become an increasingly common tool used to model, explain, and
predict phenomena of human behavior and societies. EGT provides the theoreti-
cal and practical computational tools to study the general, dynamic, and emergent
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properties of social systems and phenomena, including agent behaviors, culture, and
norms. EGT studies the effects of evolutionary pressures on populations of agents:
a population of agents making choices according to an assigned strategy in a game
that models a situation of interest. After agents have played the game (or games),
they reproduce into the next generation according to a reproduction function or
population dynamic that, generally speaking, increases the frequency of the types of
agents that were successful in the current generation. In this manner EGT adds an
important dynamical aspect to classical game theory for studying human behavior.
Often this evolutionary process can lead to complex population dynamics that
affect the change and prominence of agent behaviors over time. EGT generally
aims to analyze populations under such dynamics and to identify and characterize
solution concepts such as evolutionary stable states - states in which the popula-
tion has stabilized and generally speaking cannot be taken over by an arbitrarily
small number of invading new agents. Such analysis can aid the prediction of agent
behaviors in given environments and improve the understanding of behaviors and
norms by illuminating the (evolutionary) reasons for their existence. In addition,
it is relatively easy to validate, complement, and aid EGT analysis using computer
simulation.
The social science literature is filled with examples of empirical studies showing
that humans violate the strong rationality assumptions of classical game theory.
EGT is thus an attractive framework under which to model human behavior in such
domains, because the assumption of perfectly rational agents - in the classical game
theoretic sense - is not required. The focus of EGT approaches is generally not
5
to define internal preferences and whether or not agents satisfy these. Rather, the
focus is to allow for all of a viable range of preferences or strategies and to evaluate
these according to their evolutionary fitness, which is external. The dynamic relative
fitness of existing preferences and strategies then determines which strategies become
norms, which of them become extinct, or if a variety of strategies remain in the
population cycling in a predator-and-prey-type dynamic. To this date, evolutionary
game theoretic approaches have been used to study a great variety of social and
cultural phenomena. Examples of such phenomena studied through evolutionary
games include cooperation, altruism, and reciprocity [6, 4, 8, 78, 93, 101, 25, 24,
48, 114, 74, 83, 15, 97, 97, 19, 80], trust and reputation [34, 71, 20, 61, 44], fairness
and empathy [9, 77, 87], punishment [85, 16, 18, 49, 51, 20, 21, 103, 52], and social
learning [100].
Despite the fact that EGT is generally not concerned with defining internal
preferences of agents a priori, there exists a need for closer coupling of EGT work
with empirical evidence and theories from social sciences. Many evolutionary envi-
ronments of concern are too complex to allow for the feasible consideration of all
possible combinations of agent strategies and game parameters. Empirical evidence
from the social sciences can aid in limiting the complexity of the evolutionary game
environment of interest, by constraining or specifying the possible strategies, model
of interactions and social learning process. Furthermore, comparing results of EGT
models to empirical data enables researchers to enhance and refine these models to
make their predictions more specific and more accurate. Conversely, EGT models
can identify aspects of the game environment crucial to evolutionary outcomes, thus
6
providing information that can inspire additional empirical studies aimed at char-
acterizing these aspects. EGT models can also provide predictive models that can
be tested through actual empirical experiments.
1.3 Phenomena Explored
The phenomena I explore are i) risk preferences and implications on the evo-
lution of cooperation and ii) the willingness of humans to punish others for norm
violating behavior. The following two paragraphs give a brief motivation for each,
along with an overview of the models employed and results acquired in this thesis.
My work on risk preferences is inspired by an abundance of empirical evidence
that human decision-making under risk does not coincide with expected value max-
imization and is state-dependent.A considerable effort has been invested into the
development of descriptive theories of human decision-making involving risk (e.g.
Prospect Theory). An open question is how behavior determined by these descrip-
tive models could have been learned or arisen evolutionarily. I contend that the
answer to this question lies, at least in part, in the interplay between risk-taking,
sequentiality of choice, and population dynamics in evolutionary environments. I in-
troduce a framework of simple lottery games in which agents make sequential choices
between risky and safe lotteries to study this problem. This framework allows for the
study of risk behavior of agents in evolutionary environments through mathematical
analysis and computer simulation. Investigations of this lottery game framework in
conjunction with known population dynamics provide the novel insight that for a
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large range of population dynamics which model imitation, the interplay between
risk-taking and sequentiality of choices leads to the emergence of state-dependent
risk preferences that do not maximize expected value. The specific risk preferences
that emerge resemble well-known descriptive models of decision-making. Aside from
evolutionary lottery games I also explore a sequential evolutionary version of the
well-known stag hunt game, demonstrating how the principal discoveries from my
evolutionary lottery game framework can facilitate the evolution of cooperation in
classic game theoretic games where cooperation entails risk.
My work on punishment is inspired by empirical social science that shows that
there are striking differences across cultural groups in their willingness to punish
norm-violating behavior. While punishment has been a prevalent research subject
in psychology and EGT, the conditions under which different propensities of pun-
ishment are more or less adaptive for humans groups has received less attention.
Using Public Goods Game models in which I operationalize several forms of societal
threat, I show how these cross-cultural differences in the use of punishment are at
least partially determined by differences in cultures’ exposure to these threats. This
illuminates the evolutionary basis for the wide variation in punishment rates that
exists around the globe and helps promote cross-cultural understanding by showing
how cultural differences in punishment propensities, which may appear puzzling, are
generally adaptive to the society’s ecological and historical context.
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1.4 Thesis Outline
The rest of this proposal is organized as follows: Chapter 2 describes in detail
my work on the evolution of state-dependent risk preferences in an evolutionary lot-
tery game framework. Chapter 3 describes how the results on risk preferences in the
lottery game framework apply to games of social interaction. Chapter 4 describes
in detail my work on cultural differences in punishment norms. These Chapters
provide motivation, relevant background, and related work on the phenomena ex-
plored, describe the evolutionary game theoretic models developed to study these
phenomena, and provide results from mathematical analysis and multi-agent sys-
tem simulations. Chapter 5 discusses how evolutionary game theoretic approaches
fit into the study of culture in psychology. Chapter 6 concludes with summary of
the results and contributions in this thesis.
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Chapter 2
Evolution of State-Dependent Risk Preferences
Empirical evidence shows that human decision-making, rather than conform-
ing to the decision-theoretic notion of expected-value maximization, is state-dependent:
the decisions are sometimes risk-averse and sometimes risk-seeking, depending on
the decision maker’s circumstances. Much effort has been invested into describ-
ing and modeling such behavior, but these efforts have largely lacked an explicit
investigation of what evolutionary pressures might have influenced the behavior’s
spread. Thus an important open question is why state-dependent risk behavior is
so prevalent. I contend that the answer to this question lies, at least in part, in the
interplay between risk-taking, sequentiality of choice, and population dynamics in
evolutionary environments.
To demonstrate this, I use tools from evolutionary game theory to investigate
how agents’ risk behavior relates to different population dynamics (i.e., rules gov-
erning changes in the number of agents of each kind). The particular population
dynamics I explore are imitation dynamics, which model cultural evolution as a
product of social learning by imitation.
The probably best-known imitation dynamics are the replicator dynamic and
the imitate-the-better dynamic, but there also are many others and empirical evi-
dence on which one corresponds to human imitation is unclear. Hence I consider a
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parameterized class of imitation dynamics in which the parameter 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 yields
the replicator dynamic with α = 1 and the imitate-the-better dynamic with α = 0.
This study includes (1) a detailed mathematical analysis of how different imitation
dynamics can affect risk behavior when agents make sequential choices, and (2) sim-
ulations, using several different imitation dynamics, of evolutionary lottery games
in which agents make sequential choices among lotteries that have equal expected
value but different risks. Results demonstrate that for every population dynamic in
this class except for the replicator dynamic, the interplay between risk-taking and
sequentiality of choices allows state-dependent risk behavior to have an evolutionary
advantage over expected-value maximization.
My investigations also consider a sequential choice evolutionary version of the
well-known stag hunt game. While the lottery game results show how agents that are
sometimes risk-prone and sometimes risk-averse can outperform agents that make
decisions solely based on the maximization of the expected values of the outcomes,
the stag hunt game results show how this can facilitate the evolution of cooperation
in situations where cooperation entails risk.
This work provides a starting point for further investigation of how popula-
tion dynamics influence risk behavior in evolutionary game environments. I antici-
pate that state-dependent risk behavior will outperform expected-value-maximizing
strategies in a large variety of evolutionary game environments involving sequential
choices of different risks.
The next section provides background on human decision making under risk
and evolutionary game theory. The following sections describe imitation dynamics,
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the lottery game framework, and analysis and simulation results on the evolution of
state-dependent risk behavior.
2.1 Human Decision Making Under Risk
Human decision making under risk is the subject of much research effort in
the social sciences. In most of the existing literature on models of human decision
making under risk, the construction of such models is approached primarily through
the analysis of a decision maker’s choices among lotteries that have different pay-
off distributions, and thus potentially different risks. Under the most traditional
model of decision making, expected utility theory, a rational agent’s preferences
can be modeled by assigning to each possible outcome a number called the out-
come’s utility; and a rational choice is one that maximizes the expected utility of
the outcomes [120]. Empirical evidence of human decision making under risk shows
that humans are sometimes risk-averse, sometimes risk-seeking, and even behave
in ways that systematically violate the axioms of expected utility [60]. Expected
utility theory can account for different attitudes towards risk through certain von
Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions (e.g. [38]). Such risk propensities can differ
greatly from simple expected-value considerations on prospective outcomes.
Researchers have invested much effort into constructing utility functions that
appropriately model human decision making under risk under the expected-utility
model (e.g. [38, 58, 92]). Related efforts in economics have aimed to describe the
preferences of humans over inter-temporal lotteries, recognizing the effects of tem-
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porally successive lotteries on risk preferences [32, 33]. Other studies define utility
functions that take into account inter-personal or population comparisons [1]. Yet
other researchers have constructed alternative descriptive theories of decision mak-
ing that claim to correspond more closely to how humans make decisions involving
risk. Among the most popular of these models are prospect theory [60, 118], regret
theory [64], and SP/A (Security-Potential/Aspiration) theory [65, 66, 67]. One ad-
vantage of these models is that they more explicitly or perhaps more naturally model
some of the mechanics involved in human decision making processes. For example,
state-dependent attitudes toward risk are modeled in prospect theory by using a
reference point with respect to which prospective outcomes can be interpreted as
potential gains or losses, and are modeled in SP/A theory by including an aspiration
level as an additional decision criterion in decisions involving risk. A common theme
of both Prospect theory and SP/A theory is that agents are risk-averse when they
have done well relative to some reference point, and risk-seeking when they have
not done well relative to the reference point.
Several recent works speculate about the relation of risk-related behavior and
biological evolutionary factors [54, 94, 107]. Our work differs from and expands
such study by providing explicit analyses and simulations of risk behavior using
evolutionary-game models intended to reflect both biological and cultural evolution.
To study risk behavior in the framework of EGT, I model the situation of
interest as a game in which agents are faced with choices among lotteries of different
risks. As described in [2], these lotteries dispense resources that are considered to
be an objective quantity of which 1) agents always want more than less and 2)
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interpersonal comparisons are meaningful. The reproduction function defining the
dynamics of strategies in the population then acts directly on these resources.
2.2 Imitation Dynamics
Imitation dynamics are a class of population dynamics commonly used to
model the evolution of behaviors in societies [53, 76, 55, 75, 31]. The general frame-
work for imitation dynamics is stated by Hofbauer and Sigmund [53] as follows:
We shall suppose that occasionally a player is picked out of the popu-
lation and afforded the opportunity to change his strategy. He samples
another player at random, and adopts his strategy with a certain prob-
ability.
In what follows, I refer to these players as the observer and the observed agent,
respectively.
Important theoretical studies have been done of two specific imitation dy-
namics. One of these is the replicator dynamic [111, 98, 99, 53, 40], in which the
probability that the observer adopts the strategy of the observed agent is propor-
tional to how much more successful the observer was than the observed. The other
is the imitate-the-better dynamic [10, 119, 109, 93, 46, 26, 112, 116],1 in which the
observer always adopts the observed agent’s strategy if it was more successful than
the observer’s strategy.2
1The imitate-the-better dynamic is sometimes called tournament selection [93].
2Vega-Redondo generalizes the imitate-the-better dynamic by allowing the observer to observe
a collection of agents and adopt the strategy of the most successful agent [119].
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Several experimental studies investigating social learning through imitation
between humans have found experimental support for Vega-Redondo’s model [56,
57, 81]. Experiments on human imitation reported by Apesteguia et al. [3] indicate
that the difference in observed payoff to an agent’s own payoff does affect imitation
(the higher the difference, the more likely imitation occurs). This is more in line
with Schlag’s model. Due to this evidence for both imitation models, in I explore
a parameterized range of imitation dynamics based on a definition in [53], that
includes the replicator dynamic, the imitate-the-better dynamic, and a spectrum of
other dynamics in between those two.
2.3 Evolutionary Lottery Game Model
Here I describe the sequential lottery game, a class of games that I use to
investigate risk behavior under evolutionary pressures. I also describe the particular
range of imitation dynamics under which I explore the evolution of risk behavior.
2.3.1 Sequential Lottery Game
We shall consider a game in which agents acquire payoffs dispensed by lotteries.
In each generation, each agent must play an n-lottery game defined as follows:
Definition 1. An n-lottery game is a game in which an agent make a sequence of
n choices, where each choice is between two lotteries3: a safe lottery, whose payoff
3The choice of payoffs here is arbitrary. The results in this chapter would be roughly qualita-
tively similar if we had used any fixed value v for the safe lottery’s payoff and v+ δ and v− δ (for
fixed δ) for the risky lottery’s payoffs.
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is always 4, and a risky lottery, which one can win (a payoff of 8) with probability
p, or lose (a payoff of 0) with probability 1− p.
Note that if p = 0.5, both lotteries have expected value 4.
Our population consists of agents that follow strategies chosen from the set
S = {s1, . . . , sk} of all possible pure strategies for the sequence of lottery choices.
In any generation, a vector x = (x1, . . . , xk) gives the state of the population, where
each xi is the proportion of agents in the population using strategy si. Let π(i)
denote the payoff accumulated in a generation from the n lottery choices by agents
of type i (i.e. agents following strategy si).
2.3.2 Population Dynamics
As discussed in Section 2.2, we want to explore a range of population dynamics
that includes the replicator dynamic, imitate-the-better dynamic, and dynamics
intermediate between these two extremes. Hofbauer and Sigmund [53] give the




xj|π(i)− π(j)|α sign(π(i)− π(j)), (2.1)
where xi is the current proportion in the population of agents of type i, ẋi is the
change in xi over time,
4 and α ≥ 0 is a parameter that determines the particular
4As is common in the evolutionary game theory literature, Hofbauer and Sigmund approximate
the current population as a real-valued function xi(t) where t is the current time, so that ẋi =
dxi/dt.
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imitation dynamic. My formulation is based on theirs, but incorporates the following
changes:
• We are interested in population dynamics based on payoff comparisons among
individuals, as in [10, 109, 93, 46, 112, 116, 26]. To model payoff comparisons
among individuals, we must take into account the stochastic variability in
the payoffs to individual agents. We can do this by treating π(i) and π(j)
as discrete random variables representing the distributions of payoffs that an
agent of type i and an agent of type j receive from their lottery choices.
• The imitate-the-better dynamic and the replicator dynamic correspond to α =
0 and α = 1, respectively. Since the imitation dynamics that interest us are
these two and and the ones that are intermediate between them, we only
consider 0 ≤ α ≤ 1.
If we let r and s be any possible payoff values acquired by agents of type i and j,
and let p(r, s) the probability of obtaining this pair of values, then our modified









s |(r − s)|α sign(r − s) · p(r, s) is the switching rate between
two agent types i and j. This switching rate determines the effect that a pairing for
imitation between agents of type i and j has, on average, on type i’s growth rate in
the population. For example, if ∇α(i, j) is positive, a pairing for imitation between
agents of type i and j (which happens with non-zero probability if agents of type i
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Table 2.1: All of the possible pure strategies in our lottery game when n = 2.
Strategy 1st lottery 2nd lottery
SS choose safe choose safe
RR choose risky choose risky
SR choose safe choose risky
RS choose risky choose safe
RwS choose risky choose safe if 1st lottery was won, risky otherwise
RwR choose risky choose risky if 1st lottery was won, safe otherwise
and j exist in the population) on average has a positive effect on i agents’ growth
rate. If this is the case, we say i has an evolutionary advantage over j.
2.4 Analysis and Theoretical Predictions
In the two-choice sequential lottery game, there are six possible pure strategies.
These are listed in Table 2.1.5
Table 2.2 gives each each strategy, its possible numeric payoffs, and the prob-
abilities of these payoffs for the case where p, the probability of wining the risky
lottery, is 0.5. Note that in this case, all six strategies have the same expected
5For simplicity, I have restricted this study to pure strategies. For lottery games like the ones
we are considering, the reproductive fitness of a mixed strategy is intermediate among the pure
strategies in the mixed strategy’s support, hence the inclusion of mixed strategies should not have
a substantial affect on our results.
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Table 2.2: Payoff distributions of the six pure strategies in the sequential lottery
game with n = 2 and p = 0.5. All six strategies have the same expected payoff, 8,
but differing distributions. In this table and others in this section, we use boldface
numbers to denote payoff values, and non-boldface to denote probabilities.
RwS RwR SR RS SS RR
Payoff V 12 8 0 16 8 4 12 4 12 4 8 16 8 0
Prob. P (V ) .5 .25 .25 .25 .25 .5 .5 .5 .5 .5 1 .25 .5 .25
payoff value of 8, but they have differing probabilities of being above or below 8.
For example, P [π(RwS) > 8] = 0.5 and P [π(RwS) < 8] = 0.25.
In this section, we shall examine how these strategies will perform against one
another for different population dynamics (Sections 2.4.1, 2.4.2, and 2.4.4) and for
different expected values of the lotteries (Section 2.4.4), culminating in an evolu-
tionary stability result for the RwS strategy (Section 2.4.5). Finally, Section 2.4.6
briefly discusses cases where n 6= 2.
2.4.1 The Replicator Dynamic
I now show that under the replicator dynamic (α = 1), the switching rate
between any two agent types is equal to the difference in their expected payoffs.
Proposition 1. Under the population dynamics given by Eq. (2.2) when α = 1,
∇α(i, j) (the switching rate between any two agent types i and j) is the difference
between the expected payoffs of agents of type i and j (given by the discrete random
variables π(i) and π(j)).
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Proof. Let r and s be possible payoff values acquired by agents of type i and j, and












(r − s) · p(r, s) = EV (π(i)− π(j)).
Assuming independence between payoffs, ∇α(i, j) = EV (π(i)−π(j)) = EV (π(i))−
EV (π(j)), and the proposition follows.
Since all strategies have the same expected payoff in this environment, Propo-
sition 1 tells us that the switching rate between any two strategies will be 0. Con-
sequently, all six of the above strategies will perform equally well evolutionarily.
2.4.2 The Imitate-the-Better Dynamic
If we use the imitate-the-better dynamic (α = 0), then in Eq. (2.2), only the
sign of the payoff difference between two paired agents plays a role in determining
the switching rate; the magnitude of the difference is irrelevant. We can compute
the switching rate between two strategies by using the probabilities in Table 2.2 to
calculate the probability of each pair of payoffs occurring. Table 2.3 shows these
values for the RwS vs. RR pairing. We can then use these probabilities as the
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Table 2.3: Payoff distribution for RwS vs. RR in the sequential lottery game with





16 0.125 0.0625 0.0625
8 0.25 0.125 0.125
0 0.125 0.0625 0.0625
values of p(r, s) in Eq. (2.2) to calculate the switching rate, as follows:
∇α(RwS,RR) = sign(0− 0) · 0.0625 + sign(8− 0) · 0.0625 + sign(12− 0) · 0.125
+ sign(0− 8) · 0.125 + sign(8− 8) · 0.125
+ sign(12− 8) · 0.25 + sign(0− 16) · 0.0625
+ sign(8− 16) · 0.0625 + sign(12− 16) · 0.125
= 0.0625 + 0.125− 0.125 + 0.25− 0.0625− 0.0625− 0.125
= 0.0625.
Using similar calculations, we see that∇0(RwS,SS) = 0.25,∇0(RwS,RwR) =
0.0625, and ∇0(RwS,RS) = ∇0(RwS,SR) = 0. This suggests that RwS will be
able to consistently win an evolutionary competition against RR, RwR, or SS and
remain stable with SR and RS in this environment. The experimental results in
Section 2.5 verify this prediction.
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2.4.3 All Imitation Dynamics (Arbitrary α)
For 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, we can calculate the switching rate in a method similar to
the previous section, combining the probabilities from Table 2.2 to get the values
of p(r, s) for Eq.(2.2). However, since both the sign and magnitude of the payoff
differences are now important, the calculation is slightly more complex. For instance,
the switching rate for the RwS vs. RR pairing is now as follows:
∇α(RwS,RR) =|0− 0|α sign(0− 0) · 0.0625 + |8− 0|α sign(8− 0) · 0.0625
+ |12− 0|α sign(12− 0) · 0.125 + |0− 8|α sign(0− 8) · 0.125
+ |8− 8|α sign(8− 8) · 0.125 + |12− 8|α sign(12− 8) · 0.25
+ |0− 16|α sign(0− 16) · 0.0625 + |8− 16|α sign(8− 16) · 0.0625
+ |12− 16|α sign(12− 16) · 0.125
=4α(0.125) + 8α(−0.125) + 12α(0.125) + 16α(−0.0625).
Figure 2.1 shows how the switching rate between RwS and the other strategies
varies with α. One can see that RwS has an advantage over all other strategies for
0 < α < 1, suggesting that RwS should be able to win any evolutionary competition
in these environments. Again, this prediction is supported by the simulation results
in Section 2.5.
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Figure 2.1: Switching rate between RwS and each of the other five pure strategies for
0 ≤ α ≤ 1. A positive switching rate indicates an evolutionary advantage of RwS
against the other strategy (in a population made up of solely the two strategies).
We see that RwS has such an advantage over all other strategies when 0 < α < 1,
and all but SR and RS when α = 0.
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2.4.4 Differing Expected Values of Lotteries (Arbitrary p)
We now consider the case where p, the probability of winning the risky lottery,
is any number between 0 and 1 (whence the risky lottery’s expected value is between
0 and 8). Table 2.4 gives the probability distributions for each pure strategy.
We can also construct a new probability matrix for each pairing, such as the
one for RwS vs. RR shown in Table 2.5. We can then compute the switching rate
for our pairing as before. For example, the switching rate for RwS vs. RR is now
∇α(RwR,RR) =|0− 0|α sign(0− 0) · (1− p)4
+ |8− 0|α sign(8− 0) · (1− p)3p
+ |12− 0|α sign(12− 0) · (1− p)2p
+ |0− 8|α sign(0− 8) · 2(1− p)3p
+ |8− 8|α sign(8− 8) · 2(1− p)2p2
+ |12− 8|α sign(12− 8) · 2(1− p)p2
+ |0− 16|α sign(0− 16) · (1− p)2p2
+ |8− 16|α sign(8− 16) · (1− p)p3
+ |12− 16|α sign(12− 16) · p3
=4α(2(1− p)p2 − p3) + 8α((1− p)3p− 2(1− p)3p− (1− p)p3)
+ 12α(1− p)2p+ 16α(1− p)2p2
Notice that when p > 0.5, the risky lottery has a higher expected value than
the safe lottery, and the opposite is true when p < 0.5. Thus, RR has the highest
expected value when p > 0.5, and SS has the highest expected value when p < 0.5.
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Table 2.4: Payoff distributions of the six pure strategies in the sequential lottery
game with n = 2 and 0 ≤ p ≤ 1.
RwS RwR
Payoff V 12 8 0 16 8 4
Prob. P (V ) p (1− p)p (1− p)2 p2 (1− p)p (1− p)
RS, SR SS RR
Payoff V 12 4 8 16 8 0
Prob. P (V ) p (1− p) 1 p2 2(1− p)p (1− p)2
Table 2.5: Payoff distribution for RwS vs. RR in the sequential lottery game with
n = 2 and arbitrary p. Entries in the table show give the probabilities that each




16 p3 (1− p)p3 (1− p)2p2
8 2(1− p)p2 2(1− p)2p2 2(1− p)3p
0 (1− p)2p (1− p)3p (1− p)4
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Figure 2.2: The shaded area indicates values of p and α for which the switching rate
between RwS and the expected-value maximizing strategy (i.e. RR if p ≥ 0.5, SS
otherwise) is greater than 0. RwS is at a disadvantage in terms of expected utility
when p 6= 0.5, but it still manages to retain its evolutionary advantage for a wide
range of values.
Surprisingly, even though RwS has a suboptimal expected value when p 6=
0.5, by examining the switching rates we can see that it still has an evolutionary
advantage over both SS and RR for many values of p and α. Figure 2.2 shows the
values of p and α for which ∇α(RwS,RR) > 0 and ∇α(RwS,SS) > 0, meaning that
for these values of p and α, RwS has an evolutionary advantage over expected-value
maximizing strategies. Under the imitate-the-better dynamic (α = 0), the range
is surprisingly large. For example, RwS outperforms SS even when p = 0.4, and
SS has a significantly higher expected value than RwS. As α increases, the range
shrinks at a roughly linear rate, disappearing at α = 1 (i.e., the replicator dynamic).
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2.4.5 Evolutionary Stability of State-Dependent Risk Behavior
This section discusses whether RwS is an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS)
in the 2-lottery game when p = 0.5 and 0 < α < 1. I first give the classical definition
of an ESS, explain why it cannot be directly applied to n-lottery games when α 6= 1,
and propose an intuitive modification to make it applicable. I then show that RwS
fits our modified definition of an ESS.
2.4.5.1 Evolutionary Stability under Imitation Dynamics
In an evolutionary game, a population of agents using an ESS is resilient
against an arbitrarily small number of incoming agents that use any other strategy
[69]. According to Maynard Smith, strategy S is an ESS if for every strategy T 6= S,
one of the following conditions holds:
• E(S, S) > E(T, S);
• E(S, S) = E(T, S) and E(S, T ) > E(T, T );
where E(X, Y ) is the expected payoff an agent receives by playing strategyX against
strategy Y [69].
This definition does not apply directly to the n-lottery game, because it as-
sumes the population dynamics are governed by the replicator equation, for which
the expected payoff of a strategy pairing is all that is necessary to determine whether
one strategy will grow or shrink in population proportion compared to the other.
As described in the work summarized in Section 2.4.4, with imitation dynamics
other than the replicator dynamic, the expected value of a pairing is not sufficient
27
to determine which strategy will perform better in the n-lottery game. Instead, one
must use the switching rate ∇α(X, Y ) rather than E(X, Y ) when defining evolution-
ary stability for the n-lottery game under imitation dynamics. This is appropriate
because if there are many agents using X and few using Y , then
• ∇α(X,X) > ∇α(Y,X) implies that X will grow faster playing against itself
than Y will grow playing against X, so Y will not be able to gain population
and will eventually die off;
• ∇α(X,X) = ∇α(Y,X) and ∇α(X, Y ) > ∇α(Y, Y ) implies that X and Y grow
at the same rate when playing against X, but X grows faster than Y when
playing against Y , so Y will still not be able to gain population and will
eventually die off.
and these scenarios correspond to the two conditions for X to be an ESS in the
classical definition.
Replacing expected value with switching rates in the definition above gives us
the following definition for an ESS in the n-lottery game:
Definition 2. A strategy S is an evolutionarily stable strategy in the n-lottery game
if on of the following two conditions holds:
• ∇α(S, S) > ∇α(T, S) or
• ∇α(S, S) = ∇α(T, S) and ∇α(S, T ) > ∇α(T, T )
for all T 6= S.
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Combining these conditions and considering the definition of the n-lottery
game (Definition 1), we get the following simpler condition for ESS:
Lemma 1. A strategy S is an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) in the n-lottery
game if, for any strategy T 6= S, ∇α(S, T ) > 0.
Proof. If for any strategy T 6= S ∇α(S, T ) > 0, then ∇α(S, S) > ∇α(T, S) holds for
any strategy T 6= S, since ∇α(S, S) = 0 and ∇α(S, T ) = −∇α(T, S) for all S and
T . Thus the first condition of Definition 2 holds, which is sufficient for S to be an
ESS.
2.4.5.2 RWS is Evolutionarily Stable
This section shows that RwS is an ESS by Lemma 1 for the 2-lottery game with
p = 0.5 and 0 < α < 1. To do this, one must show that it has a positive switching
rate with an arbitrary strategy. Therefore, the first step must be to devise a method
for representing an arbitrary strategy for the 2-lottery game. One can find that, if
the decisions an agent makes and the possible lottery outcomes are arranged into
a game tree as shown in Figure 2.3, then any strategy can be expressed as Sa,b,c,d,
where a, b, c, and d give the agent’s probability of choosing the risky lottery at each
of the four decision nodes indicated in the figure. For instance, the pure strategies
we have been dealing with thus far can be represented as follows (here, a “-” in
place of one of the four probabilities indicates that any value is acceptable, since
the decision corresponding to that probability is never reached):
• SS is S0,−,−,0
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Figure 2.3: Representation of the 2-lottery game as a game tree consisting of decision
nodes, in which the agent chooses between a risky (R) and safe (S) lottery, lottery
nodes, and terminal nodes, which assign the agent its total payoff. Any strategy in
this game can be represented as Sa,b,c,d, where a, b, c, and d give the probabilities of
choosing the risky lottery at each of the four corresponding decision nodes.
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• RR is S1,1,1,−
• RS is S1,0,0,−
• SR is S0,−,−,1
• RwS is S1,0,1,−
• RwR is S1,1,0,−
We can now calculate the switching rate between RwS and an arbitrary strat-
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]
ab.
Appendix A gives a full derivation. Intuitively, this says that the switching rate
for the arbitrary strategy is just the probability that the strategy follows the pure
strategies SS, SR, RS, and RR, times the switching rate between RwS and each
of those strategies. Given the above derivation for ∇α(RwS, Sa,b,c,d), we get the
following evolutionary stability result:
Theorem 1. RwS is an evolutionarily stable strategy in the n-lottery game with
p = 0.5 and 0 < α < 1.
Proof. By Lemma 1, we know that RwS is an evolutionarily stable strategy if
∇α(RwS, Sa,b,c,d) > 0 holds. Eqn. 2.3 gives this switching rate between RwS and
any other arbitrary strategy Sa,b,c,d in the 2-lottery game. The three bracketed terms
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are all strictly greater than 0 for 0 < α < 1; in fact, they are identical to the curves
in Figure 2.1 for SR/RS, SS, and RR, respectively. Given that the bracketed
terms are strictly positive, ∇α(RwR, Sa,b,c,d) > 0 unless a = 1, b = 0, and c = 1.
Since S1,0,1,− is equivalent to RwS, this means that ∇α(RwR, Sa,b,c,d) > 0 for all
Sa,b,c,d 6= RwS. Thus, RwS is an evolutionarily stable strategy by Lemma 1 and
Definition 2.
2.4.6 Higher Number of Sequential Choices (n > 2)
With the exception of Section 2.4.5.1, the presented theoretical development
has been largely restricted to the case n = 2. This Section desceibes briefly what
happens for other values of n.
The case n = 1 is relatively trivial: there are only two pure strategies, both
are unconditional, and both perform equally well (for more details, see [95]).
The case n > 2 is very hard to analyze, because the number of pure strategies
is super-exponential in n. However, intuition suggests that the behavior pattern
exhibited by RwS for n = 2, namely to play safe when having done well and risky
otherwise, should also have an advantage when n > 2. I discuss some simulation
experiments that support this intuition in Section 2.5.2.1.
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2.5 Simulations
For further investigations of the dynamics in a population consisting of all pure
strategies, the next section describes results of computer simulations of agent-based
models playing the two-choice evolutionary lottery game.
2.5.1 Setup and Implementation
Simulations for the two-choice lottery game environment in this Section explore
population evolution under a variety of parameter combinations of α (the imitation
parameter) and p (the probability of winning the risky lottery). The types of agents
included were the six pure strategies for the two-choice game described earlier. All
simulations started with an initial population of 1000 agents for each agent type.
To correspond with the imitation dynamics given by Eq. (2.2) in the finite
population agent-based model, I used a pairwise comparison process [112] to model
the transmission of strategies among agents. Each generation, after all agents have
received payoffs from chosen lotteries, each agent i compares its (individual) payoff
ρ(i) to that of a randomly drawn agent from the population j (with payoff ρ(j))
and adopts the strategy of this agent with a probability q if ρ(j) > ρ(i). In order to
achieve the parameterized dynamics given by Eq. (2.1) in the agent-based model, I
use
q = [|ρ(j)− ρ(i)|/∆ρ]α, 0 ≤ α ≤ 1,
where ∆ρ is the highest possible difference in payoff. Figure 2.4 provides pseudo-
code on how this pairwise comparison imitation process was implemented.
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LOOP for each agent in population
Select current agent (imitator) from population
Select random agent (observed) from pop
Let ρim = payoff achieved by imitator
Let ρobs = payoff achieved by observed
Let ∆ρ = highest possible payoff difference
Let r = random number in [0, 1)
Let q = [|ρim − ρobs|/∆ρ]α
# Imitate observed agent with probability q based on payoff comparison
IF ρim < ρobs AND r <= qTHEN
Place an agent following the strategy of observed into next generation
ELSE
Place an agent following the strategy of imitator into next generation
END IF
END LOOP
Figure 2.4: Pseudo-code for the pairwise comparison imitation process used to re-
produce agents into the next generation in the evolutionary simulations. Takes
parameter 0 ≤ α ≤ 1.
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α = 1
Figure 2.5: Results of simulation for α = 0 in the population dynamic and p = 0.5.
Plot shows the number of agents of each type over the course of evolution for 500
generations.
2.5.2 Results
Figures 2.5, 2.6, and 2.7 show the results for simulations with p = 0.5 for
each α = 1 (the replicator dynamic), α = 0 (the imitate-the-better dynamic), and
α = 0.5. Each plot is an average over 20 simulation runs (the amount of variation
from one run to another was quite small). These experiments confirm my analysis
from Section 2.4.5.2, which shows that RwS has an evolutionarily advantageous risk
behavior under any 0 ≤ α < 0.
As predicted by my analysis, RwS outperformed the other strategies evolu-
tionarily except when α = 1:
35
α = 0
Figure 2.6: Results of simulation for α = 0 in the population dynamic and p = 0.5.




Figure 2.7: Results of simulation for α = 0.5 in the population dynamic and p = 0.5.
Plot shows the number of agents of each type over the course of evolution for 500
generations. Simulation runs for α = 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, and 0.8 produced qualitatively
identical results to the case of α = 0.5.
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• For α = 1, all of the strategies performed equally well and remained at their
initial population counts.
• For α = 0, the state-dependent strategy RwS outperformed the other strate-
gies. RwS rose in population proportion relatively quickly to comprise the
majority (> 2/3) of the population and remained there throughout subse-
quent generations. Furthermore, the two unconditional strategies SR and RS
remained, comprising the proportion of the population not taken over by RwS.
• For α = 0.5, the RwS agent population grew similarly as for α = 0, but here
RwS also had an advantage against SR and RS (as indicated by Figure 2.1)
and thus continued to grow to comprise 100% of the population.
I also ran simulations with α = 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, and 0.8. The results for these α
values are all essentially equal to the case of α = 0.5. The only difference is that
the rate at which RwS grows to take over the population is inversely related to α
(i.e. for larger α values, it takes longer for RwS to take over the population).
In order to explore lottery games in which the risky lottery has a different
expected value than the safe lottery, I also ran experiments with p = 0.3, 0.4, 0.55,
and 0.7. These values were chosen because for α = 0, Section 2.4.4 showed that for
two of them (p = 0.4, 0.55) RwS has an evolutionary advantage over the expected-
value-maximizing strategy, and for the other two (p = 0.3, 0.7) the expected-value-
maximizing strategy has an evolutionary advantage over RwS.
As shown in Figure 2.8, 2.9, 2.10, and 2.11, the simulation results confirm the
theoretical predictions. More specifically:
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• For p = 0.2 (Figure 2.8), SS is the expected-value maximizing strategy and it
takes over the population.
• For p = 0.7 (Figure 2.11), RR is the expected-value maximizing strategy and
it takes over the population.
• Even though SS is the expected-value-maximizing strategy for p = 0.4 (Fig-
ure 2.9) and RR is for p = 0.55 (Figure 2.10), in both cases RwS has an
evolutionary advantage and takes over the population.
In Figures 2.9, 2.10, and 2.11, some fluctuations occur before stabilization. These oc-
cur because of the differing amounts of evolutionary advantage that different strate-
gies have over others. For example, a strategy a may grow in number temporarily
because it has an advantage over another strategy b. But once b becomes extinct
(or sufficiently small in number), a will diminish because some other strategy c has
an advantage over a.
2.5.2.1 Simulations for n > 2
In Section 2.4.6, I hypothesized that RwS’s behavior pattern, namely to be
risk-averse when it has done well and risk-seeking when it has done badly, may be
advantageous in lottery games with n > 2. To test this hypothesis, I ran experiments
for the case n = 4, using the six strategies shown in Table 2.6.
For my simulations I used an initial population of 1000 agents of each type,
and the parameters p = 0.5 for the risky lottery and α = 0 for the population
dynamic. The results were qualitatively the same as the ones in Figure 2.7: the
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p = 0.3
Figure 2.8: Results of simulation with p = 0.3 for the risky lottery and α = 0.




Figure 2.9: Results of simulation with p = 0.4 for the risky lottery and α = 0.




Figure 2.10: Results of simulation with p = 0.55 for the risky lottery and α = 0.




Figure 2.11: Results of simulation with p = 0.7 for the risky lottery and α = 0.
Plot shows the number of agents of each type over the course of evolution for 500
generations.
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Table 2.6: Pure strategies in the lottery game simulations for n = 4.
Strategy Behavior
SSSS always choose safe
RRRR always choose risky
SSRR choose safe in lotteries 1 & 2, then choose risky in 3 & 4
RRSS choose risky in lotteries 1 & 2, then choose safe in 3 & 4
RRwSS choose risky in lotteries 1 & 2,
then choose safe in 3 & 4 only if 1 & 2 were won, else choose risky
RRwRR choose risky in lotteries 1 & 2,
then choose risky in 3 & 4 only if 1 & 2 were lost, else choose safe
RRwSS strategy dominated the other strategies and grew to comprise 100% of
the population. This would seem to confirm my hypothesis—but since there are
hundreds of pure strategies when n = 4 and I only looked at six of the simpler ones,
the result should be regarded as preliminary.
2.6 Relations to Alternative Decision Making Models
The manner in which the RwS strategy deviates from expected value max-
imization in the lottery games can be characterized as risk-averse (preferring the
safe choice) when doing well in terms of payoff and risk-prone (preferring the risky
choice) otherwise. Similar risk behavior is suggested by models such as prospect
theory [60, 118] and SP/A theory. In prospect theory, people are risk-seeking in the
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domain of losses and risk-averse in the domain of gains relative to a reference point.
In SP/A theory [67], a theory from mathematical-psychology, aspiration levels are
included as an additional criterion in the decision process to explain empirically
documented deviations in decision-making from expected value maximization.
One explanation for the existence of decision-making behavior as described by
such models is that the described behavioral mechanisms are hardwired in decision
makers due to past environments in which the behaviors provided an evolutionary
advantage [54]. Another interpretation, not necessarily unrelated, is that the utility
maximized by decision makers is not the payoffs at hand, but a different perhaps
not obvious utility function. Along these lines, [30] proposes a model of decision
making that includes probabilities of success and failure relative to an aspiration
level into an expected utility representation with a discontinuous (at the aspiration
level) utility function. Empirical evidence and analysis provided in [88] provide clear
support for the use of probability of success in a model of human decision making.
All these descriptive theories provide for agents to be sometimes risk-prone and
sometimes risk-averse, depending on their current state or past outcomes, such as
the RwS in the presented simulations.
The sequentiality of choices in my game simulations allows for such state-
dependent risk behavior to be explicitly modeled. One could theoretically model
the sequential lottery game in normal form, i.e. reduce the choices to a single
choice between the payoff distributions listed in Table 2.4. Doing so would provide
essentially equivalent results except that the asymmetry in the payoff distribution of
lotteries would be the determining factor of agent successes. In such a representation
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however, the analysis of risky and safe choices, and agents’ preferences among them
becomes blurred. In fact, I believe that a tendency towards modeling games in
normal form often leads people to overlook the impact of sequentiality on risk-
related behavior.
I believe my results show that imitate-the-better models an important mecha-
nism that can lead to the emergence of risk-taking behavior with similar character-
istics to that captured in alternative, empirical evidence-based models of decision
making like the ones discussed above. Whenever reproductive success is not directly
proportional to payoff (i.e., a reproduction mechanism other than the pure replica-
tor dynamics),6 risk propensities that differ from expected value maximization have
the opportunity to be more successful than agents that solely consider expected
value in their local choices. This suggests that there are many other reproduction
mechanisms for which expected-value agents can be outperformed by agents that
vary their propensities toward risk-taking and risk-averseness.
2.7 Discussion
This chapter explored risk behavior of agents through analysis and simulation
of evolutionary lottery games. The results demonstrated how the interplay between
sequentiality of choice and population dynamics can affect decision making under
6We say “pure” here because replicator dynamics can be modified to make reproductive success
not directly proportional to payoff. For example, if a death rate (e.g. [79]) is implemented as
a payoff-dependent threshold function, one might expect risk propensities to differ depending on
whether an agent is above or below that threshold, similar to an aspiration level in SP/A theory.
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risk. Specifically, for any imitation dynamics other than the pure replicator dy-
namic, there are evolutionary game environments in which the RwS strategy has an
evolutionary advantage over expected-value maximization. Since RwS’s risk-taking
behavior is similar to the risk preferences captured in several prominent models
of human decision making, this suggests that population dynamics other than the
replicator dynamic may model an important mechanism for the emergence of those
risk preferences. The RwS strategy exhibits behavior that is sometimes risk-prone
and sometimes risk-averse depending on its success or failure in the previous lottery.
Such a behavioral characteristic is provided for in descriptive theories of human de-
cision making based on empirical evidence. It is not far-fetched to suppose that
when human subjects have exhibited non-expected-value preferences in empirical
studies, they may have been acting as if their decisions were part of a greater game
of sequential decisions in which the success of strategies is not directly proportional
to the payoff earned. Apart from a purely biological interpretation, in which cer-
tain behavioral traits are hardwired in decision-makers due to past environments,
perhaps such empirical studies capture the effects of the subjects’ learned habit of
making decisions as part of a sequence of events in their daily lives.
2.7.1 Limitations and Avenues for Future Work
General avenues for future work include investigating how a greater range of
population dynamics and sequential choices can affect risk behavior as well as if
and how such results apply to a variety of other games and situations. The vast
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majority of current literature of evolutionary game-theoretic approaches considers
situations of non-sequential choice, even though it seems clear that in many do-
mains of interest sequential choice and resulting diversity in strategies exist. The
presented lottery game simulations and evolutionary game analyses are a first step
in exploring evolutionary mechanisms which can induce behavioral traits resembling
those described in popular descriptive models of decision making. In general, there
is much more opportunity for future work to use evolutionary game approaches for
the purpose of exploring or discovering the mechanisms which induce, possibly in a
much more elaborate and precise manner, the risk-related behavior characteristics
described by prospect theory or other popular descriptive decision making models
based on aspiration levels.
Some specific ways in which this work could be extended are listed below:
• It is important to examine other population dynamics in which a strategy’s
reproductive success is not always proportional to its expected payoff. For
example, if a death rate (e.g. [79]) is implemented as a payoff-dependent
threshold function, one might expect risk propensities to differ depending on
whether an agent is above or below that threshold, in a manner similar to
behavior above or below an aspiration level in SP/A theory. A specific related
topic to explore is how the prospect-theoretic notion of setting a reference
point may relate to evolutionary simulations with sequential lottery decisions.
• My study focused primarily on the case n = 2, i.e., in each generation the
agents made two decisions. It should hold that state-dependent risk prefer-
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ences like those of RwS should also have an advantage when n > 2, and
Section 2.5.2.1 discussed some pilot experiments that support this intuition.
Conducting more extensive studies may be an worthwhile topic for future work.
Also, empirical studies that seek to estimate the rate (in terms of number of
choices made) at which humans tend to update their strategy would seem im-
portant in determining what specific type of state-dependent risk behavior is
to be expected in what certain environments or contexts.
• This work generally assumed a well-mixed population in which every agent
was able and equally likely to imitate any other. It would be interesting to
explore the possible effects of social or physical structures (that may guide or
constrain imitation) on the evolution of risk behavior. Along these lines, see
Section 3.5.1.
• Finally, this work has highlighted the need conduct more specific empirical
studies of which type of imitation dynamics best models human imitation
propensities under which conditions. The insights of this paper combined
with such knowledge have potential application in any domain where human
decision making under risk is of interest.
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Chapter 3
Risk Behavior in Games of Interaction
The evolutionary lottery games investigated in Chapter 2 did not involve in-
teractions between agents in the stage game, which allowed for the analysis of risk
behavior in an isolated manner. This Chapter shows how the principle observations
from the lottery game investigations apply to a popular social dilemma game of
safety and cooperation. I consider an evolutionary game in which agents play two
sequential stag hunt games in a generation. Like the prisoner’s dilemma [5], the stag
hunt is a game that models a dilemma between cooperation and noncooperation. I
demonstrate how a strategy essentially equivalent to the RwS strategy in the lottery
games can have an advantage in this evolutionary stag hunt environment, and how
this advantage impacts the evolutionary results. (For an extensive discussion of the
stag hunt game, see e.g. [108].)
3.1 Stag Hunt Environment
The stag hunt environment I consider is equivalent to the sequential lottery
game environment, except now payoffs are acquired through two sequential two-
player stag hunt games rather than through single-player lotteries. The payoff ma-
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trix I use for the stag hunt game is shown in Table 3.1.1 Each generation, all agents
are randomly paired to play a two-player stag hunt game. Agents receive payoff from
the first game and then are randomly paired again for a second game, the payoffs of
both games are accumulated. After these payoffs are accumulated, agents reproduce
into the next generation according to population dynamics as before (which means
an additional random pairing for imitation under the imitate-the-better dynamic).
Since agents play two sequential stag hunt games, I will call this an evolutionary
double stag hunt game.
Table 3.1: Payoff matrix used in the stag hunt game. The payoff values are chosen
as to coincide with the lottery games, but keep the relevant payoff relations of the
stag hunt.
Stag Hare
Stag 8, 8 0, 4
Hare 4, 0 4, 4
3.2 Risk and Strategies
A significant difference between the stag hunt environment and the lottery
game environment is that in the former payoffs are not stochastic due to probabilities
on the payoffs themselves, but due to the probabilities of playing against a stag agent
1Many different payoff matrixes may be used for the stag hunt game, as long as the payoffs
satisfy certain constraints. I chose payoff values that coincide with my lottery games, but keep the
relevant payoff relations of the stag hunt.
51
(i.e., cooperator, always hunts stag) or hare agent (i.e., defector, always hunts hare)
in the social game. Assume the initial population consists of 50% stag agents and
50% hare agents. Hence, for a new agent entering the population, hunting stag is
a risky choice that will pay 8 with probability of 0.5 and 0 with probability 0.5.
Hunting hare on the other hand is a safe choice that will always pay 4. One can
thus define the equivalent of an RwS strategy in this environment as follows: hunt
stag (the risky choice) in the first stag hunt game; if the stag payoff was achieved in
the first game, hunt hare (the safe choice) in the second game, otherwise hunt stag
again in the second game.
Given what we have learned from the lottery game results in this Chapter,
we know that in a population approximately split equally between stag and hare
players, the RwS strategy just described should have an evolutionary advantage
under imitate-the-better (but not under replicator dynamics). This is because with
50% stag and 50% hare agents, the choices that an agent has to make in the two
stag hunt games—as described in the previous paragraph—are equivalent in payoff
distributions to those of the two-choice lottery game.
I describe simulation experiments that I have run to confirm this hypothesis
and to investigate the impact it has on population evolution in Section 6.4. But first
I provide some general analysis of the double stag hunt game environment required
to explain my experiments and results.
52
3.3 Analysis
Consider a population consisting of hare and stag agents. Let s be the pro-
portion of stag agents in the population. The payoff to a hare agent will be 4 in
each stag hunt game, thus hare agents will accumulate a payoff of 8 in a generation
of the double stag hunt environment. The payoff to a stag agent will depend on s,
the probability of playing another stag player in each game. An accumulated payoff
of 16 is only achieved if the agent plays another stag agent (getting a payoff of 8)
in both games, which occurs with probability s2. If the agent plays a hare agent
(getting a payoff of 0) in both games, it receives a total payoff of 0, which occurs
with probability (1 − s)2. Finally, if the agent plays a hare agent (payoff of 0) in
one game and a stag (payoff of 8) agent in the other, it receives a total payoff of 8,
which occurs with probability 2s(1 − s). Table 3.2 lists these payoff distributions
achieved by agents in a population consisting of hare and stag agents in the double
stag hunt game environment.
Table 3.2: Payoff distributions for agents in a population of stag and hare agents in
the double stag hunt environment. s denotes the proportion of stag agents in the
population.
agent hare stag
payoff 8 16 8 0
probability 1 s2 2s(1− s) (1− s)2
It can be shown easily that in a population of (50%) stag and (50%) hare
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agents, neither strategy will have an advantage (on average) over the other under
either replicator dynamics or imitate-the-better. Under replicator dynamics, the
average payoff of both strategies is equal, and under imitate-the-better, the prob-
abilities that either strategy will achieve a higher payoff than the other is equal.
However, under both population dynamics, if one of the agent types increases in
population proportion due to random variation, that agent type will bootstrap it-
self to take over the entire population.
Under replicator dynamics a random (arbitrarily small) increase in s will lead
to a higher average payoff of stag agents, which in turn leads to more offspring,
which again leads to a higher average payoff. More specifically, let si and si+1 be
the proportion of stag agents in generation i and i + 1, respectively. Then the
replicator equation (Eq. (1)) gives si+1 = si · fi(s)/Fi, where fi(s) is the average
payoff of stag agents and Fi is the average payoff of the population. Using the
payoff distribution information from Table 3.2, we get:
fi(s) = 16s
2 + 16s(1− s) + 0(1− s)2 = 16s,
Fi = sf(s) + 8(1− s) = 16s2 − 8s+ 8,
si+1 = 16si
2/(16si
2 − 8si + 8).
Since we are are dealing with a population of only stag and hare agents, the pro-
portion of hare agents at any generation j is simply hj = (1− sj). Figure 3.1 plots
si+1 and hi+1, the proportion of stag and hare agents in generation i + 1 against
si, the proportion of stag agents in the previous generation. We can see that if by
random variation we arrive at a generation j in which sj 6= 0.5, if sj < 0.5, then sj
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Figure 3.1: Plot of si+1, the proportion of stag agents in generation i+ 1, and hi+1,
the proportion of hare agents in generation i + 1 against si, the proportion of stag
agents in generation i, under replicator dynamics.
goes to 0, and if sj > 0.5, then sj goes to 1. Thus eventually one of the agents will
bootstrap themselves to take over the entire population. If neither strategy has an
advantage when s = 0.5, and we have a population split equally between hare and
stag agents, the population converges to 100% hare or 100% stag agents with equal
likelihood under replicator dynamics.
Similarly under imitate-the-better random variation in population proportion
will lead to the population being taken over entirely by either hare or stag agents.
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When pairing agents for imitate-the-better, we have the following possible pairing
probabilities and resulting reproductions:
P(stag vs. stag) = s2, whence stag reproduces.
P(hare vs. hare) = (1− s)2, whence hare reproduces.
P(stag vs. hare) = 2s(1− s)2, whence the agent with the higher payoff repro-
duces, or a random agent if payoffs are equal.
We can calculate si+1 under imitate-the-better by combining these pairing
probabilities and the payoff distribution information from Table 3.2. Doing so gives:
si+1 = P(stag vs. stag) · 1 + P(hare vs. hare) · 0 +
+ P(stag vs. hare)[P(stag ’s payoff is 16) + P(stag ’s payoff is 8)/2]
= si
2 + 2si(1− si)[si2 + si(1− si)]
= 3si
2 − 2si3.
Figure 3.2 plots si+1 and hi+1 against si under imitate-the-better. We can see that,
as for replicator dynamics, an arbitrarily small increase in s will lead to a higher
reproduction probability for stag, which will in turn increase s in the next generation.
The opposite effect occurs for an arbitrary small decrease in s. As for the replicator
dynamics, eventually one of the agents will bootstrap themselves to take over the
entire population. If neither strategy has an advantage when s = 0.5, and we have
a population split equally between hare and stag agents, the population converges
to 100% hare or 100% stag agents with equal likelihood under imitate-the-better.
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Figure 3.2: Plot of si+1, the proportion of stag agents in generation i+ 1, and hi+1,
the proportion of hare agents in generation i + 1 against si, the proportion of stag
agents in generation i, under imitate-the-better.
Hence I have illustrated how under both replicator dynamics and imitate-the-
better, in a population of hare and stag agents, if one of the agent types acquires
a majority in the population (possibly due to random effects), that agent type will
bootstrap itself into taking over 100% of the entire population.
3.4 Simulations and Results
My first set of stag hunt simulation experiments above serve as a control
and as to verify that in a population of 50% stag and 50% hare agents, neither
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agent type has an advantage on average. Since the above analyzed bootstrapping
leads each simulation run to converge to 100% stag or 100% hare agents, I run a
large number of simulation runs and count the amount of times the population is
entirely taken over by either agent type. Figure 3.3 shows the counts of each for 200
simulation runs for an initial population of 3000 stag and 3000 hare agents under
both replicator dynamics and imitate-the-better. Observe that the counts are very
close, confirming that neither agent type has an advantage under either population
dynamic and the population is equally likely to evolve to full cooperation (100%
stag) and full defection (100% hare).
Figure 3.3: Simulation results for an initial population of 3000 hare and 3000 stag
agents. The plot shows the count of simulations in which the population resulted
in all stag agents (cooperation) and all hare agents (defection) for 200 simulations
under each imitate-the-better and replicator dynamics.
I have hypothesized in Section 6.2 that in a population of 50% stag and 50%
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Figure 3.4: Simulation results for an initial population of 3000 hare and 3000 stag
agents and 30 RwS agents. The plot shows the count of simulations in which the
population resulted in all stag agents (cooperation) and all hare agents (defection)
for 200 simulations under each imitate-the-better and replicator dynamics.
hare players, given the payoff matrix in Table 3.1, the RwS agent in the stag hunt
environment should have an evolutionary advantage under imitate-the-better (but
not replicator dynamics), as the two choices of hunting hare vs. stag are equivalent
to the safe vs. risky lottery choices in my earlier lottery games. My second set
of experiments serves to verify this hypothesis and investigate the impact it has
on population evolution. For this set of simulations, I used an initial population
of 3000 stag, 3000 hare, and a small amount (30) of RwS agents. I again ran 200
simulations each under replicator dynamics and imitate-the-better (the independent
variable is the population dynamics used) and compare results. The earlier described
bootstrapping of stag or hare agents occurs just the same in a population with RwS
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agents as it does in a population without. Thus all of the simulations again lead to
the population evolving to complete cooperation (100% stag)or complete defection
(100% hare).
Figure 3.4 shows the number of times that the population evolved to complete
cooperation and the number of times it evolved to complete defection under replica-
tor dynamics and under imitate-the-better. Observe that under imitate-the-better
the population evolves to all cooperators more often than under replicator dynam-
ics. A Pearson’s Chi-squared test shows this difference in the number of cooperative
outcomes between the two sets of simulations to be significant with a p-value of
0.005414 (X2 = 7.7356).
3.4.1 RWS as Catalyst for the Evolution of Cooperation
The reason a significantly higher amount of cooperation occurred under imitate-
the-better is due to the fact that the RwS strategy (as expected from the lottery
game results) had an advantageous risk behavior under the imitate-the-better dy-
namics. This led to growth in the number of RwS agents during the first few
iterations (during which the stag and hare players occupied an approximately equal
population proportion). The RwS agents in the population aid the cooperating
stag players, since the RwS agents will play stag as long as they haven not already
received a stag payoff in an earlier game. Thus RwS agents serve as a catalyst to
stag agents. Since the RwS agents initially increase under imitate-the-better, the
chance they will boost the stag players and lead them to bootstrap themselves into
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taking over the population is higher under imitate-the-better than under replicator
dynamics.

























Figure 3.5: Agent type frequencies for a typical stag hunt simulation run under
imitate-the-better in which RwS agents grew and boost stag players, leading them
to take over the entire population
Figure 3.5 shows a plot of the number of agents of each type from a typical
simulation run under imitate-the-better in which this “boosting” occurs. One can
see that the RwS agents grew from the initial 30 to over 500 agents, which was
enough aid to the cooperating stag players for them to take over the population.
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Once the stag agents grew to a significantly higher population proportion, hunting
stag is no longer as much of a risky choice, and the RwS agents begin to decline in
numbers. In summary, these experiments showed that the principle lessons learned
from the lottery game simulations can apply and impact the results of other (social)
evolutionary games, in this case promoting the emergence of cooperative behavior
in an evolutionary double stag hunt environment.
3.5 Discussion
The evolutionary stag hunt game investigations in this Chapter demonstrated
how the results from the lottery games of Chapter 2 can apply in other, more com-
plex and commonly studied games of social cooperation. The results show how
the advantage of conditionally risky behavior under imitate-the-better can promote
the evolution of cooperation in a situation where the cooperation requires a risky
decision (namely, choosing to cooperate). Hence, the existence of state-dependent
risk preferences in conjunction with an imitate-the-better social learning dynamic
increased the likelihood that cooperation emerged as a norm in the population. I sus-
pect that the interplay between risk taking, sequential choices, and population dy-
namics can impact a variety of other games (e.g. the Prisoner’s Dilemma) similarly.
Simulation source code and result data used for this Chapter are made available for
download online: http://www.cs.umd.edu/users/roos/materials/ACS2010.html.
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3.5.1 Risk in Games on Graphs
In the evolutionary stag hunt game presented, the risk involved in a hunt
stag or hunt hare action stemmed from the likelihood that the opponent would
pick either action. Since to demonstrate the main points here I only considered
well-mixed populations here, in which every agent was equally likely to play any
other agent in the population, it may seem very unlikely that the distribution of
agents would be so diverse in a population as to produce a significant variance in
the risky choice and a resulting significance of RwS agents. This is because, as
demonstrated, any population would rather quickly arrive at an all hare or all stag
agent equilibrium, and only a relatively small proportion of different agents would
be entering the population through mutation or exploration dynamics. However,
in evolutionary games on graphs (e.g. [20, 82, 96, 97, 22]), where the interactions
between agents is structured on a graph in which agents are nodes and play their
neighbors, it is much more likely that agents would face a more diverse group of
opponents. Agents generally have a much lower number of neighbors to possibly
interact with, and thus rare mutations or explorations would have a much greater
effect on (local) strategy diversity and resulting risky-choice variance.
3.5.2 Winner-Takes-All Interpretation of Imitate-the-Better
Both this and the previous Chapter have considered the imitate-the-better
dynamic as a type of social learning process of imitation, but it is worth noting
that this population dynamic has another analogy, giving it a broader scope of
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applicability. This alternate analogy is that of winner-take-all games [121, 29, 7].
In a winner-take-all game, the agent that acquires the higher payoff of two agents
reaps all the benefits, meaning, in evolutionary terms, that the agent with higher
acquired payoff is the only agent that replicates. Real life examples of winner-take-
all situations are patent races or various forms of price competition, and it has been
argued that many species’ mating process is winner-takes-all, i.e. a “winner-takes-
all game determines reproductive success” (the more well-off agent gets to mate)
[121, 7]. This suggests that my results on risk-taking under the imitate-the-better
dynamic has applicability to a broader spectrum of situations and environments
than those in which social learning governs the reproductive dynamics.
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Chapter 4
Societal Threat and the Evolution of Punishment
Propensities Across Cultural Groups
In this chapter I employ evolutionary game theoretic approaches to model and
investigate the evolution of human behaviors. This work specifically considers the
evolution of cultural groups, with the goal to understand and explain differences in
empirically observed characteristics between them. The specific cultural character-
istic explored is the willingness of individuals to punish others for norm-violating or
non-cooperative behavior.
There are striking differences across cultural groups in their willingness to
punish norm violators. However the conditions under which punishment of norm
violators is more adaptive or less for human societies and whether such differences
have an evolutionary basis has received little attention. To fill this void, I propose
that punishment propensities vary across groups at least partially as a function of
the degree of threat to which societies are exposed, because different punishment
propensities are optimal for group survival or stable under different threat condi-
tions. Whether there exists such a causal relationship between societal threat and
adapted punishment propensities is difficult, if not impossible, to test with labora-
tory or field studies. But this question is well-suited to evolutionary game theoretic
65
(EGT) models, since such models allow for the observation of the effects of varying
threat levels on the evolution of punishment propensities.
A considerable number of studies have studied the evolution of punishment
in conjunction with cooperation through the Public Goods Game, a popular social
dilemma metaphor in which groups of individuals interact under a choice to Coop-
erate by contributing or to Defect by withholding contribution to a public good. To
date, a primary concern of these studies is how different forms of punishment can
arise and how they aid the evolution of punishment; none of these models, however,
have considered the question of how different punishment propensities may evolve
across groups.
In this chapter, I analyze the effects of varying degrees of different types of
societal threats through EGT models based on the Public Goods Game, and show
through mathematical analysis and computer simulations how differences in pun-
ishment propensities can arise from differences in the group’s exposure to societal
threats. I consider the evolution of punishment under two reasonable evolutionary
PGG models that differ in strategy set choice and the manner in which punishment
propensity is modeled. I focus on whether there is an evolutionary advantage (or
disadvantage) that different punishment propensities give a population. Thus I first
use a basic model which simply assumes that different groups or populations have
a way of maintaining a certain probability with which Cooperating members pun-
ish Defectors. I consider this probability the group’s punishment propensity and
can examine effects on evolutionary viability of a population under different circum-
stances by varying it. I refer to this model as the Basic Model. I also seek to replicate
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these effects in another, more complex PGG model with punishment. Recently, [52]
proposed a model that shows how responsible punishment can evolve in a popula-
tion model that allows for anti-social and spiteful punishment while simultaneously
avoiding the problem of higher order free-riding (cooperative outcomes being en-
dangered by Cooperators that do not punish Defectors invading the population).
Hence, I also consider this more expanded model, which includes the state-of-the
art strategy set including 16 strategies and a form of reputation proposed by [52].
I refer to this model the Hilbe and Traulsen Model. Since in this model agents ei-
ther punish or do not punish, I consider a population’s punishment propensity to
be the proportion of punishing agents in the population. The consideration of these
two alternative models in this chapter also serves to illustrate the robustness of the
general results presented.
Social scientists have identified a number of societal threats cultural groups
might face to widely varying degrees, including external man-made threats such
as invasions or warfare threatening a society’s own territory and ecological threats
such as natural disasters. Operationalizing these threats in the evolutionary game
models and investigating their impact on evolutionary dynamics shows that in-
creased levels of these threats lead to increased punishment propensities. In the
basic model this occurs because under increased threat, increased punishment is
required to maintain high cooperation rates, providing high overall group payoffs.
Hence to increase chances for survival under cultural group selection [48, 13, 114],
societies facing higher degrees of societal threat require higher punishment propen-
sities. However, since punishment is costly, punishment propensities too far above
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the required amount can reduce overall group payoff. Thus group selection favors
groups that maintain optimal propensities only slightly higher than what is needed
to sustain cooperation under their particular threat conditions. Interestingly, in the
Hilbe and Traulsen Model, no group selective pressures are needed for the differences
in punishment propensities to arise from differences in societal threat. In this model,
assuming a game parameter range under which populations can uphold cooperation,
a mix of punishers and non-punishers is evolutionarily stable within the population,
and this mix consists of a higher proportion of punishers under higher degrees of
threat. This work provides a critical insight into the study of cultural variation
in punishment by showing how populations that have higher societal threat evolve
higher punishment propensities, and that this relationship is of a causal rather than
merely correlational nature.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In the next Section, I
provide some more background on social science work concerning punishment and
motivation for this research. Section 4.2 describes the general evolutionary Public
Goods Game with punishment and the general population dynamics that specify
the change in strategy frequencies within a group or population used throughout
the models. Section 4.3 discusses the societal threats that I will operationalize in
the models. Sections 4.4 and 4.5 then respectively describe the Basic Model and the
Hilbe and Traulsen Model in detail and show how in both models the relationship
between societal threats and punishment support my hypothesis. Finally, Section 4.6
concludes this Chapter with a discussion of the results.
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4.1 Punishment Propensities in Humans
There is large amount of evidence that a willingness to engage in (costly) pun-
ishment exists in humans [36, 35, 86, 91, 42, 28, 41, 23, 72, 51] and that punishment
of Defectors can play a vital role in the evolution of cooperation [18, 12, 16, 20, 21,
104, 49, 45, 48, 47, 113, 44, 123]. Yet there are striking differences across cultural
groups in their willingness to punish people who violate social norms [51, 68, 50].
Early anthropological research showed that traditional societies have differing pun-
ishment propensities for norm violations: some groups (e.g., the Hutterites and
Hanno) have severe punishment, and others (e.g., the Kung Bushman, Cubeo) ex-
hibit much greater permissiveness [89]. Recent evidence shows that modern cultures
also vary widely in their punishment of norm-deviating behavior [51, 68, 50].
More recently, in research across 33 nations, [39] placed cultures around the
world on a psychological dimension scale of “tight” vs“loose”. They showed that the
“tightness”, i.e. strength of social norms and punishment of deviations from them,
of human cultural groups or populations is related to a broad array of ecological
and human-made societal threats (or lack thereof) that nations have historically
encountered. They argued that a high degree of threat increases the need for strong
punishment systems to facilitate the coordination necessary for survival. Nations
with few ecological and human-made threats, by contrast, have a much lower need
for order and social coordination, affording weaker social norms and much lower
punishment of deviant behavior. Societies that have had high degrees of territorial
threats (from 1918-2001), low natural resources (e.g., food supply and water re-
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sources), and high degrees of natural disasters (e.g., floods, cyclones, and droughts)
and human disease (pathogen prevalence) had much stronger norms and punishment
of deviance than societies that had low levels of these threats. The correlational
nature of this research, however, leaves open the question of whether groups actu-
ally require stronger punishments to survive under high threat, and more generally
whether differences in punishment across societies has any evolutionary basis.
4.2 Evolutionary Public Goods Game (PGG)
The Public Goods Game (PGG) is a well-established paradigm for studying
cooperation and norm violation [45, 20, 21, 49, 48, 113, 44], and it has also been
used to study punishment [20, 21, 113, 123]. In the PGG, N players may each either
Cooperate (contribute some amount c) or Defect (contribute nothing). If more than
one player contributes, the sum of all contributions is multiplied by a factor r. The
resulting amount is divided evenly among all players, regardless of whether they
contributed. The higher the proportion of Defectors, the less there is to share. Due
to the temptation to defect, it would be easy for the entire population to fall into a
state of all Defectors. However, several studies have shown how social mechanisms
such as individual-based peer-punishment or institutional punishment can foster
and establish cooperative behavior as a societal norm [18, 16, 20, 21, 49, 113, 123].
Under peer-punishment, if a Cooperator decides to punish a Defector, punishing
reduces the Defector’s payoff by ρ, at a cost λ to the Cooperator.
Following established work on PGG models [45, 113, 123], each generation, the
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model samples multiple disjoint game-groups from the population to play.1 Each
game-group plays a PGG, then Cooperators have a chance to punish Defectors in
their game-group. After num games samplings and PGGs played, the population
changes under a combination of total-payoff-proportional imitation and random ex-
ploration of strategies. Payoff-proportional imitation can be viewed as a process
of social learning in which agents imitate other agent’s strategy with a probability
that increases with the agent’s payoff. This process is commonly modeled in infinite
population models through the replicator dynamics [40, 53]. Alternatively, the pro-
cess is often modeled in finite populations using the Fermi Rule [11, 110, 115, 52]:
an agent a imitates (switches to) a randomly chosen other agent b’s strategy with a
probability pa→b = 1/(1 + e
−s(πa−πb)), where πa and πb are the total payoffs of a and
b respectively, and s ≥ 0 is the selection or imitation strength. I assume all agents
update their strategy in such a way simultaneously each generation. Random explo-
ration (i.e. exploration dynamics) of strategies are analogous to random mutation.
Such random exploration of the available strategy space has recently been shown
to play an important and often underestimated role in human strategy updating
within social contexts [113, 117].
1I shall use the term “game-group” to refer to any group of agents playing a PGG within
a population, while I more generally use the term “group” as synonymous to “population” or
“society” when I refer to group selection.
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4.3 Societal Threats
Social scientists have identified a number of societal threats cultural groups
might face to widely varying degrees. These include ecological threats such as natu-
ral disasters and external man-made threats that threaten a society’s territory (e.g.
invasions or warfare) [39]. The degree of tightness (strength of social norms and
punishment of deviations from them) of different cultures was found to correlate
positively with the cultures’ exposure to such threats. In the following subsections
I discuss these categories of threat and describe how they are operationalized in the
PGG models.
Figure 4.1: Correlation between cultures’ exposure to natural disasters, a type of
ecological threat, and cultural tightness.
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Figure 4.2: Correlation between cultures’ exposure to food depravation, a type of
ecological threat, and cultural tightness.
4.3.1 Ecological Threats
Nations that face ecological threats such as floods, tropical cyclones, droughts,
or higher prevalence of pathogens, have been found to tend to stronger norms and
punishment systems [39]. See e.g., Figures 4.1 and 4.2, which show correlations
between more natural disasters (r = .47, p = .01) and higher food deprivation
(r = .52, p < .001) with the degree of tightness of cultures. Presumably, having
strong norms and punishment of deviants enables such groups to coordinate social
action and survive in the face of such severe threats. Similarly, nations that have a
high prevalence of pathogens, particularly those that are highly communicable (e.g.,
tuberculosis), require stricter rules in order to avoid contamination and ultimately
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Figure 4.3: Correlation between cultures’ exposure to territorial threats from their
neighbors, an external man-made threat, and cultural tightness.
enhance survival. In their field research, [39] found historical prevalence of pathogens
to be higher in tight nations as were the number of years of life lost to communicable
diseases, the prevalence of tuberculosis, and infant and child mortality rates. By
contrast, societies that do not face natural disaster threats can afford to have a fewer
rules and weaker punishment systems.
All of these threats may lead to inefficiencies in production, or managing them
may require the use of the population’s resources. Natural disasters are also related
to the availability of natural resources in that they often diminish agricultural yields
and engender food shortages [90]. Hence, a straightforward way to operationalize
ecological threats in the PGG models is by decreasing the payoff to the group mem-
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bers in general. One can do this by varying the parameter r, the multiplication
factor of contributions creating the public good to be divided among agents in both
the Basic Model and the Hilbe and Traulsen Model.
4.3.2 External Man-Made Threats
External man-made threats that threaten a society’s territory include, e.g.,
migration, intentional sabotage, and territorial invasion. [39]’s field research found
that societies facing potential invasions from neighboring groups (and by extension,
facing challenges to their group resources) developed stronger punishment systems
than societies that had few territorial threats. See Figure 4.3, which shows the
correlation between cultures’ exposure to territorial threats from their neighbors
during the period 1918-2001 and the degree of tightness of the culture (r = .41, p =
.04). One way to operationalize this type of threat is to reduce a population’s overall
payoff, as above, since resources that would otherwise go to the population must
instead be used to fend off threats. Another reasonable alternative is to model
this type of threat as an invasion of Defectors: by taking some of the group’s payoff
without contributing, Defectors in effect steal from the group: they decrease the per-
capita payoff, hurting group survivability. The threat’s intensity can be interpreted
as the size of the invasion of Defectors.
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4.4 Basic Model
This section describes the strategy sets used in the Basic Model, and show
how different degrees of threats in this model relate to punishment. Since the
strategy set for the Basic Model is relatively simple, I can provide mathematical
analysis of the theoretical infinite population dynamics to provide a basic intuitive
insight into the dynamics between cooperation, defection, and punishment in the
PGG. I represent the basic population dynamics mathematically through a system
of ordinary differential equations ODEs that is solvable for the effects of different
model parameters on evolutionary outcomes, and I shall use this system of ODEs
to explore the effects of different threats.
4.4.1 Strategy Set
The strategy set composing the Basic Model simply consists of Cooperators
and Defectors. As described in the Introduction, the main objective of this work
is to explore the relationships among various types of societal threat, punishment
propensity, and evolutionary outcomes. Hence I model a punishment propensity as
a probability q with which a Cooperator in any particular group punishes Defectors.
Modeling punishment in this sense allows not only for the representation of different
punishment propensities in different cultures, but, as I shall show, it also allows
us to describe optimal punishment propensity values (in terms of overall group
payoff) under different conditions of societal threat. While assuming the existence
of such a general punishment propensity within a population is not standard in
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EGT modeling, I believe that empirical evidence showing differences in punishment
propensity across populations supports this assumption, and I note that there are
various mechanisms (e.g. honor, reputation, or conformist transmission) through
which a society may uphold a certain propensity to punish among its members.
If a certain degree of punishment propensity is necessary for a society to reach
cooperative, high-payoff outcomes and hence survive (on its own or under group
selective pressures), I believe it is reasonable to assume that societies that do survive
have found or developed some mechanism to uphold such a degree of punishment.
4.4.2 Analysis
For the theoretical infinite populations case of the Basic Model, the replicator
dynamics with mutation described below (Eqn. 4.2) combined with the equations
giving the expected payoffs for agent types (shown in Eqns. 4.4 and 4.5) give us a
parameterized system of ODEs solvable numerically for the change in agent type
frequencies over time under different conditions. Under replicator dynamics we con-
sider payoffs achieved by agents as analogous to the agent’s fitness, i.e., an agent’s
probability of reproducing is directly proportional to these payoffs [40, 53].The
change in population proportions according to the replicator dynamics is thus given
by the following ODE:




where xi is the proportion of agents of type i in the population, πi(x) is the
expected payoff an agent of type i, and θ(x) is the expected payoff of all agents in
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the population. An agent’s type is simply the strategy it employs to make choices.
I shall use xC and xD to denote the proportion of Cooperators and Defectors in
the population. To also include random exploration of strategies in the population





xjπj(x)Qji − θ(x)xi, (4.2)
where the matrix Q gives the mutation probabilities from one agent type to
another. With a mutation rate µ and n strategy types Qij = (1− µ/n) if i = j and
Qij = µ/(n− 1) if i 6= j.
Since in the model game-groups of size N are sampled at random from the
population to play PGGs, we need to calculate the average (expected) payoffs to
each agent type by considering the probabilities of group compositions. Following
this approach, for any given agent sampled to play a PGG in a game-group of size









With k cooperating co-players and N − k Defectors, the payoff to each Defector
is rk/N from the common good, minus, kqρ, since Defectors are punished by Co-
operators in the group with probability q. Thus, considering group composition

















(N − 1)xC . (4.4)
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In a group of k Cooperators and N − k Defectors as co-players, the payoff to
a Cooperator is r(k + 1)/N − c from the common good (k + 1 because the player
itself cooperates), minus q λ (N − k − 1) due to the cost of punishing Defectors in
the group with probability q (there are N − k − 1 Defectors in the group and each
is punished with likelihood q). Thus, again considering all group compositions and


















− c− qλ(N − 1)xD. (4.5)
A population under replicator-mutator dynamics and the strategies and pay-
offs above can maintain a high level of cooperation as long as there exists a large
enough punishment propensity q among the Cooperators relative to the number of
Defectors currently in or entering the population. As an example, for a population
consisting of Cooperators in which Defectors are introduced by mutation µ = 0.01
and the game parameters r = 3, c = 1, λ = 1, ρ = 1, N = 5, Cooperators must have a
punishment propensity of q ≥ 0.13889 to avoid a take-over by Defectors. More gen-
erally, if it is possible for Cooperators to withstand Defectors through punishment,
there exists a value for the minimum punishment propensity required to withstand
Defectors (dependent on the game parameters). I denote such a required punish-
ment propensity qreq. If a population’s punishment propensity q < qreq, Defectors
take over the entire population, I refer to this as a societal break-down. However, if
q > qreq, the population withstands the Defectors, maintains high cooperation rates,
and hence high overall payoff. See Figure 4.4 for an illustration of the population
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dynamics in both cases. The population dynamics given by Eqn. 4.2, using the
expected payoffs for player types (Eqn. 4.4 and 4.5), give a systems of ODEs that I
can solve numerically for (qreq) under different game conditions (and hence different
conditions of societal threat). The results in Figure 4.5 described in the Results
section were derived this way.


















































Figure 4.4: Evolution of strategy proportions of the Basic Model.The left graph
shows a break-down to defection when Cooperators have a punishment propensity q
lower than than that required to withstand take-over by Defectors (q = 0.1 < qrec).
The right shows maintenance of cooperation when q is high enough (q = 0.5 > qrec).
Game parameters r = 3, c = 1, λ = 0.3, ρ = 0.7, N = 5. Defectors are introduced by
mutation µ = 0.01.
4.4.3 Cultural Group Selection
The population dynamics described above determine the evolution of differ-
ent individuals within groups or populations, but it is important to understand
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the implications of group selection in the interpretation of the results presented.
Group selection has been argued to play an important role in cultural evolution and
promotion of cooperation [106, 37, 48, 13, 114, 14]. Generally speaking, group selec-
tion is an additional level of selection (apart from selection at the individual level)
that selects for groups based on their overall group payoff . The most straight-
forward group selection mechanism in human groups is direct group competition
and empirical studies have shown that selective pressures through inter-group lethal
competition (warfare) have been strong enough to account for the selection of altru-
istic behavior in human groups [13]. Another mechanisms of cultural group selection
are selective intergroup migration, for which substantial literature exists supporting
that migrants flow from societies where immigrants find their prospects poor to ones
where they perceive them to be better, and most immigrant populations assimilate
to the host culture within a few generations [19]. Another form of group selection
recognized is inter-group cultural transmission [19]. Group selection leads groups
which are able to maintain higher overall payoff (i.e. group fitness) to have an evo-
lutionary advantage (i.e. higher likelihood to survive) over competing groups. This
is important for the understanding of the results presented in the following Section
because these show how higher degrees of threats require higher optimal punishment
propensities to maintain high group cooperation. Because high rates of cooperation




The operationalization of societal threats in the Basic Model support the hy-
pothesis that higher threats lead to higher punishment propensities in populations.
In general, the relationship between threat and punishment in the model is as fol-
lows: there is a minimum required punishment propensity qrec that a population
requires in order to maintain cooperation and thus to be evolutionarily viable; and
qrec increases monotonically with the amount of societal threat. Any q > qrec is
neutrally stable (not considering group selection). However, I also find that there
is an optimal punishment propensity qopt slightly higher than qrec. Punishment in
excess of qopt can harm overall group payoffs, hence would be selected against under
group selection. Thus group selective pressures would favor groups that establish
punishment propensities slightly above the minimum amount needed to prevent a
societal break-down into defection, and this minimum amount of punishment is an
increasing function of the degree of societal threat faced by the group:
• Ecological Threats Increase the Required Punishment Propensity: Solving the
system of ODEs giving the population dynamics for qreq under different r
parameters shows that a higher r (less societal threat) lessens the required
punishment propensity to maintain cooperation, while a lower r (more societal
threat) raises the required punishment propensity. See left graph of Figure 4.5.
• External Man-Made Threats Increase the Required Punishment Propensity:
Solving the system of ODEs giving the population dynamics for qreq under
different invasion sizes, i.e. different proportions of Defectors entering the
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Figure 4.5: Left graph: Minimum punishment propensity required (qreq) to resist
Defector take-over as a function of the game parameter r. Higher external threat
that reduces overall payoff means a lower r value. Right graph: Minimum pun-
ishment propensity required (qreq) to resist Defector take-over as a function of the
proportion of Defectors invading the population. Both computed by solving the
system of ODEs given by the replicator dynamics of the PGG model for the mini-
mum q needed to extinguish Defectors within t = 100. Game parameters used: with
r = 3, c = 1, λ = 0.3, ρ = 0.7, N = 5.
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population, shows that the greater the influx of Defectors, the higher the
punishment propensity needed to prevent a break-down into defection. See
right graph of Figure 4.5. Hence if a group is threatened in this fashion, it
needs a higher punishment propensity against Defectors to maintain high rates
of cooperation, high group payoff, and increased chances of group survival.
• Excess Punishment is Not Optimal for Group Payoff: The above results for the
Basic Model show how increases in societal threats increase qreq, the minimum
punishment propensity needed to maintain cooperation (hence high popula-
tion payoffs), but as such do not show any reason for why any population
would not simply keep a punishment propensity of q = 1 at all times. Finite
population model simulations of the Basic Model also show (see Figure 4.6)
that there exists an optimal punishment propensity, qopt, slightly above qreq.
These simulations were done using a straight-forward implementation of the
described evolutionary PGG Model, see Appendix B for pseudo-code of the
basic simulation sequence. As is evident from Figure 4.6, punishment propen-
sities above qopt decrease the overall population payoff. This is because a
constant exploration rate leads to a continuous, unavoidable presence of De-
fectors, and punishing them is costly. This effect is especially dramatic when
there is action perception noise - a nonzero probability κ that agents will
misinterpret a cooperative action as a defection and hence punish mistakenly,
or vice versa. Hence group selection selects against punishment propensities
above qopt. This principle applies to all threat types explored.
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Figure 4.6: Overall group payoff θ vs. the punishment propensity q for a population
of 500 agents in the Basic Model (with r = 3, c = 1, l = 0.7, ρ = 0.7, N = 10, µ =
0.01, κ = 0.05). The punishment propensity qreq to withstand Defector takeover
is qreq ≈ 0.4. Note also that there is an optimal punishment propensity qopt ≈
0.5 that maximizes the overall population payoff. A group that can maintain a
punishment propensity closer to qopt will do better under group selection than if it
had a punishment propensity lower or higher than qopt.
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4.5 Hilbe and Traulsen Model with Reputation
In this section I describe the strategy sets used in the Hilbe and Traulsen
Model, and show how different degrees of threats in this model relate to punishment.
The basic qualitative interplay between cooperation, defection, and punishment of
this model are the same as that described for our Basic Model. However, since the
Hilbe and Traulsen Model uses a much more complex strategy set of a total of 16
strategies, mathematical analysis is of limited intuitive utility and the model lends
itself more readily to be explored through agent-based simulations.
4.5.1 Strategy Set
Model B is based on the state-of the art strategy set used by Hilbe and Traulsen
(2012) [52]. Using this strategy set, which includes all forms of punishment and a
form of reputation, Hilbe and Traulsen showed as a first how responsible punishment
can evolve in a population model that allows for anti-social and spiteful punishment
while simultaneously avoiding the problem of higher order free-riding (cooperative
outcomes being endangered by Cooperators that do not punish Defectors invading
the population). The model includes a total of 16 possible strategies. There are
four possible strategies to play in the contribution stage and four possible strategies
to play in the punishment phase of the PGG, as listed in Tables 1 and 2.
Two of the contribution phase strategies may take reputation about their co-
players’ punishment behavior into account when deciding whether to cooperate or
defect. The level of reputation available is modeled through an environment param-
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eter i that determines the probability with which any player knows their co-players’
punishment strategies. Opportunistic Cooperators cooperate unless they know that
it is beneficial to defect, which is the case if they know that the number of antisocial
punishers A in the group is greater than the number of responsible punishers R.
Opportunistic Defectors defect unless they know that it is beneficial to cooperate,
which is the case if they know that that the number of responsible punishers R in
the group is greater than the number of antisocial punishers A. To allow for errors
in perception, a players’ known reputation is wrong (perceived as a random other
punishing strategy) with probability e. The presence of the conditional strategies
and punishment reputation is crucial for the evolution of cooperation and respon-
sible punishment. Responsible punishers can “force” Opportunistic Defectors into
cooperating based on their reputation to punish Defectors, and hence Responsible
punishers fare better than Non-Responsible Punishers in groups with Opportunis-
tic Defectors (or Cooperators). Thus reputation fosters an intertwined benefit for
cooperators and responsible punishers.
A representative example of the population dynamics of this strategy set under
game parameters that allow for cooperation to evolve is shown in Figure 4.7. For
readability, the plots show the aggregated proportion of contribution and punish-
ment strategies over time separately. Observe that the population settles at a mix of
(Opportunistic and regular) Cooperators as well as Non-Punishers and Responsible
Punishers. The population was initialized with 100% Non-Punishing Opportunistic
Defectors (OdN), but if enough knowledge about co-players’ punishment reputation
exists (high enough i), Opportunistic Cooperators (both R and N punishing types)
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Table 4.1: Contribution Phase Strategies
Label Name Description
C Cooperator Always contributes.
D Defector Never contributes.
Oc Opportunistic Coopera-
tor
Cooperates unless it knows that it is benefi-
cial to defect based on punishment reputation
of co-players.
Od Opportunistic Defector Defects unless it knows that it is beneficial to
cooperate based on punishment reputation of
co-players.
Table 4.2: Contribution Phase Strategies
Label Name Description
R Responsible Punisher Punishes defecting players.
S Spiteful Punisher Punishes everyone.
A Antisocial Punisher Punishes cooperating players.
N Non-Punisher Punishes no one.
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are able to invade the population, establishing cooperation as a norm. Once cooper-
ation is established, CN and CR agents are able to grow to significant proportions as
well. Eventually, the population settles at a mix of OcN, OcR, CN, and CR agents,
with the rest of the strategies remaining at very low proportions, introduced each
generation through exploration dynamics. (For a more detailed analysis of these
dynamics, see [52].) All simulations for this model use a population size of 1280.





















































Figure 4.7: Example of evolution of strategy proportions of Model B. Model game
and environment parameters are r = 3, c = 1, λ = 1/2, ρ = 3/2, i = 0.7, µ = e = s =
0.05, N = 5.
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4.5.2 Results
In this Section, I show that the operationalization of societal threats in the
Hilbe and Traulsen Model support our thesis that higher threats lead to higher
punishment propensities in populations. As in the Basic Model, increased threats
increase punishment propensity. The manner in which this relationship comes to
being however differs from the Basic Model, and does not even require group se-
lection. In the Hilbe and Traulsen Model, as we saw in the above example, a mix
of Responsible Punishers and Non-Punishers is stable within a population itself.
Furthermore, the proportion of Punishers and Non-Punishers that is stable varies
with societal threat in such a way that higher threat conditions lead to a higher
proportion of Punishers in the stable state of the population:
• Ecological Threats Increase Punishment Propensity: Simulations of the Hilbe
and Traulsen Model under different r parameters show that lower r (more
societal threat) raises the stable amount of (Responsible) Punishers in the
population. See left graph of Figure 4.8.
• External Man-Made Threats Increase Punishment Propensity: To measure
the effect of external man-made threat, I ran simulations in which I introduce
an influx of Defectors (in particular, Antisocial Punishing Defectors, since
the invaders are hostile) in each generation, replacing random other agents.
As before, a greater influx (proportion of Defectors added) represents higher
threat. The results show again that the greater the threat, the greater the
stable proportion of (Responsible) Punishers in the population. See right
90
graph of Figure 4.8. After an influx greater than 10% of the population, the
population breaks down into defection and hence I restricted the graph to this
influx range.
The general dynamics in the Hilbe and Traulsen Model are both different and
much more intricate than in the Basic Model. Most notably, a mix of Responsible
and Non-Punishers is evolutionarily stable within a population, while in the Ba-
sic Model, punishment propensity is only neutrally stable and group selection is
required to select between different punishment propensities. It is therefore even
more surprising that the general relationship between societal threats and punish-
ment, namely that higher threats lead to higher punishment, holds in this model just
like in the Basic Model. This demonstrates the robustness of the causal relationship
between societal threats and punishment.
4.6 Discussion
Cross-cultural social science has made great strides in understanding differ-
ences in cultural norms. This research expands upon this tradition through the
use of evolutionary game theoretic models to study the evolution of differences in
punishment toward norm violators across cultural groups. In this chapter I used
evolutionary Public Goods Games with punishment to show how societies’ optimal
(in terms of overall group payoff) punishment propensities depend on the degree of
societal threat that they face. In order to demonstrate the robustness of the results
to various modeling choices, I implemented two models: The Basic Model, which
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Figure 4.8: Left graph: Stable proportion of punishing types as a function of r.
Lower r (higher threat) leads to more Punishers. Right graph: Stable proportion
of punishing types as a function of the proportion of Defectors invading. Higher
influx (higher threat) leads to more Punishers. Each point is the stable distribution
(long-run average) determined by simulation. Game and environment parameters
used: r = 4.9, c = 1, λ = 1/2, ρ = 3/2, i = 0.7, µ = e = s = 0.5, N = 5.
assumes a population’s ability to maintain a certain propensity to punish amongst
its Cooperators, and the Hilbe and Traulsen Model, which is based on an expanded
strategy set used in state of the art work on punishment and cooperation. This
chapter considered two general types of threat examined by social science research
in relation to punishment norms: ecological disasters and other threats to group
resources, and external man-made threat. For each of these forms of societal threat
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and their plausible interpretations in the evolutionary game model, higher degrees
of threat increased the punishment propensity in the population.
While I have only explored a form of peer-punishment in this work, I should
note that recent research has demonstrated the importance and revived the explo-
ration of institutional or “co-operative” [sic] punishment as an aspect of the evolution
of cooperation [103, 59]. A general assumption is that such a punishing institution
is publicly funded through a portion of agents’ payoffs. Since institutional pun-
ishment acts as a replacement for individual punishment, strong (highly funded)
institutions result in a decreased need for peer-punishment while weak (sparsely
funded) institutions result in an increased need for peer-punishment. Most relevant
to the current research is that societal threats are likely to weaken institutions by
leading to a decrease in the overall payoff created by a society and hence a decrease
in the relative size of the institutional punishment funds available. With a decrease
in funding for (or effectiveness of) punishing institutions due to societal threats,
there is again a greater need for individual-based punishment to maintain the same
degree of cooperation. Therefore the existence of institutional or “co-operative”
punishment mechanisms in a population would not change the general relationship
between societal threat and punishment propensity illustrated in this paper.
Most existing research on punishment in evolutionary games has focused on
whether the existence of punishment is evolutionarily viable and how it can aid the
evolution of cooperation [45, 20, 21, 49, 48, 113, 44, 59, 123]. This work makes a
significant contribution to this line of research by investigating relationships among
differing degrees of societal threats, punishment propensities, and group survival.
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Grounded in relevant social science data, the presented results show that the lev-
els of societal threat to which different cultures are exposed can play an integral
role in determining differences in cultures’ evolved propensities to punish deviations
from social norms. This illuminates the evolutionary basis for the wide variation in
punishment rates that exists around the globe, may help predict changes in punish-
ment propensities in different cultural groups, and helps promote cross-cultural un-
derstanding by showing how cultural differences in punishment propensities, which
may appear puzzling, are generally adaptive to the society’s ecological and historical
context.
One limitation of the models presented in this chapter is that they investigated
punishment in societies under threat that is constant over time, or under threat at
one particular moment in time. An interesting question for future research is to in-
vestigate how societies respond to degrees of threat that vary over time. Figure 4.6
suggests that for a society to thrive under group selection, there is an evolutionary
pressure for the society to adjust its punishment propensity toward qopt. But the
figure also suggests that for punishment propensities below qopt, the possible conse-
quence (societal disintegration) is much worse than the consequence (a slightly lower
overall payoff) of too high a punishment propensity. This suggests that successful
societies may raise their punishment propensities very quickly when external threats
arise, and may be much slower to lower those punishment propensities when such
threats abate.
In conclusion, in a world of increasing interdependence, it is critical to under-
stand the mechanisms that drive cultural differences in norms. This work illustrates
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that evolutionary game theoretical models can be fruitfully integrated into cross-
cultural social science to illuminate new insights into the nature of culture.
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Chapter 5
EGT Approaches and the Study of Culture in Psychology
To this date there exists an incredibly rich literature on cultural differences
in psychological dimensions, behaviors, norms, and related social measures between
populations throughout the world. There are three main traditional theoretical
perspectives in the study of culture and psychology: the cultural psychology ap-
proach, the indigenous culture approach, and the cross-cultural approach. All of
these three perspectives recognize culture as a crucial behavioral influence, and
thus culture must be considered in understanding human behavior and cognitive
processes. However, each approach differs in its view on the extent to which uni-
versality of the human mind and psychological processes exists, and how culture
relates to this issue. Hence each approach differs in the methods employed to study
human psychology in relation to culture. My goal in this Chapter is not to give a
comprehensive overview of these approaches, their contributions (which are plen-
tiful), and their respective shortcomings. Rather, I aim to touch on the relevant
aspects of these perspectives and recent trends in the science of psychology and
culture that make evolutionary game theoretic approaches to culture a valuable and
complementary approach.
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5.1 Theoretical Approaches to Culture in Psychology
Cross-cultural psychology studies human behavior and mental processes across
different cultures, commonly seeking to find universals and discovering relationships
between psychological antecedents created by culture and the consequences of these
antecedents on behavior [63]. A different theoretical perspective is that of cultural
psychology, which, according to Schweder (1990), is the study of “the way cultural
traditions and social practices regulate, express, and permute the human psyche,
resulting less in psychic unity for humankind than in ethnic divergences of mind,
self, and emotion [102].” In the view of cultural psychology, human beings and
cultural environment, because they are so intertwined, cannot be separated analyt-
ically into independent and dependent variables, which is considered a flaw of the
cross-cultural perspective. According to cultural psychology, humans and culture
develop jointly within “intentional” worlds conceived by humans in a particular cul-
ture. A common criticism against cross-cultural approaches is that traditionally,
cross-cultural approaches do not recognize this relationship between mind and cul-
ture; and thus instead of investigating how cultural practices shape psychological
processes, cross-cultural studies are often too focused on testing the universality of
psychological processes, which, allegedly, is often incorrectly assumed. Similar criti-
cisms are sometimes made by proponents of the indigenous psychology perspective,
which emphasizes the extent to which concepts and knowledge are specific to partic-
ular cultures, and stresses that “foreign theories and categories cannot necessarily
be applied to understand behavior of a particular culture [105].”
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In more recent years, the evolutionary approach to culture and psychology has
gained more traction. The cultural evolution approach, argues that cultural diversity
develops as a result of cultural transmission [73]. Humankind’s capacity to acquire
cultural information is unique in the animal world. Humans are agents that learn
from their social surroundings, occasionally make errors in acquiring information
or simply exploring new behavior. These actions are analogous to mutations or
exploration dynamics in evolutionary game theoretic models and result in cultural
variance. Under different environmental, social, or cultural conditions, different
cultural variants may be stable, reinforced, or disappear. The existing cultural
variant in turn affect the social, cultural, and possibly environmental conditions
of that culture. In the cultural evolution view, this process is what drives the
emergence of diverse cultures and resulting behaviors and norms around the world.
I believe that in many ways, the evolutionary approach to culture is the most
precise and explicit in addressing the concerns about how culture affects behavior.
The evolutionary approach does not assume culture informing behavior or vice versa,
but through its circular process, recognizes the interdependence of the two, which
is emphasized in the work of Shweder [102], and also represented in the ecocultural
framework by Lonner and Adamopoulos [63]. As Newson, Richerson, and Boyd point
out, the evolutionary approach alleviates the most common criticism of cultural
behavior studies: namely they are not explanatory [73]. The lack of explanatory
results is a criticism that probably applies most heavily to typical cross-cultural
psychology studies, and this criticism could explain why cultural and indigenous
psychologists are adamant about maintaining their approaches. The cultural and
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indigenous approaches much more aim to “recreate” the different “worlds” within
which different cultures exist, or that different cultures have created, in order to
understand different cultural groups. I hold that evolutionary game and multi-
agent system models, while of course highly abstract and simplified, are some of
the most explicit and transparent tools at our disposal for recreating such different
worlds.
5.2 Structural Approaches to Understanding Culture
Until recently, most psychological studies took the subjective approach to cul-
ture, which generally solely considers culture as a result of individuals’ internal
mental representations. Structural approaches on the other hand emphasize the im-
portance of external factors that affect individuals’ psychology and behaviors [70].
Since EGT and multi-agent system models make it possible to operationalize such
external factors and test their effects on individuals and their behaviors, structural
approaches provide additional support for the use of these methods to study culture.
In the past few years, there has been an increase in psychological studies that explore
how external structural factors affect culture, individuals’ minds, and their behav-
ior. Examples of such structural approaches are the works of Yamagishi, Oishi, and
Gelfand et al. Yamagishi presents a niche construction approach to culture, where a
culture is a collectively created and maintained set of constraints and incentives and
agents/humans are cultural game players that behave in ways to pursue goals [122].
Oishi considers residential mobility as a specific structural factor and explores how
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it affects psychology and culture [84]. Gelfand et al., as I have discussed in Chapter
3, relate various structural factors to the degree of “tightness” or “looseness” of dif-
ferent cultures [39]. From an evolutionary game theoretic approach, such structural
studies are interesting and useful, as they present various possibilities of structural
factors and their effects that can be tested or used to inform EGT and multi-agent
system models of societies and cultures.
In general, evolutionary game theory is a useful framework to explore and un-
derstand how different external factors determine the nature of human interactions,
and how this affects the evolution and dynamics of different behaviors. Of course,
human behavior and psychology is extremely complex and consist of a multitude of
possibly interacting factors and behaviors. Thus, in line with Richerson and Boyd’s
approach of “sample theory” [17], it is crucial to begin with simple-as-possible evo-
lutionary game theoretic models that seek to understand fully the fundamental
dynamics and evolutionary relation between a characteristics of interest and basic
structural factors before moving to more complex models. A complete understand-
ing of the basic relationships between cultural characteristics and certain structural
factors form the necessary foundation to build and understand fuller, more complex,




Even with the considerable surge of evolutionary game theoretic literature in
the past decade, evolutionary game theory is still a relatively young field, especially
as applied to the social sciences. Thus there still exists tremendous opportunity
for it to be more fully integrated and applied to its potential in the social sciences
to aid our understanding of human behaviors, culture, and societies. This thesis
presents a step in this direction, solidifying evolutionary game theoretic approaches
as a complementary approach to those common in cross-cultural social sciences,
particularly psychology. The following section concludes with a summary of the
contributions of this thesis.
6.1 Summary of Contributions
This thesis has presented evolutionary game theoretic models of the dynamics
and evolution of human decision-making, specifically state-dependent risk prefer-
ences, and aspects of culture, specifically punishment norms. These models have
been constructed in close consideration of social science data and collaboration with
cultural psychologists. The inclusion of social science evidence in the construction
of models presented in this thesis enabled this work to discover important new in-
sights into the dynamics of human behaviors and culture that otherwise may have
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remained unexplored. In my work on risk preferences, I considered a range of imita-
tion dynamics for the reproduction of strategies that, according to empirical evidence
on social learning, arguably model the ways in which humans adapt their behavior
more accurately than the commonly used replicator dynamics in biological or social
applications of evolutionary game theory. In my work on punishment, empirical
evidence from cultural psychology helped in identifying the environmental factors
that may be the cause of different evolved punishment propensities, and I was thus
able to explore the effects of these factors in evolutionary game models.
The main contributions of this thesis are 1) a simple sequential lottery game
framework to study the evolution of human risk preferences and 2) demonstrations
of how the principles observed in our lottery game studies affect classic cooperation
games, and 3) game theoretic and multi-agent system-based PGG models incorpo-
rating various interpretations of societal threat to study punishment, demonstrating
how societal threat plays an integral role in determining cultures’ evolved punish-
ment propensities. More specifically:
1. Studying risk preferences under the presented lottery game framework ad-
vances the understanding of human decision-making by showing how in evolu-
tionary game environments with sequential choices, a large range of imitation
dynamics can lead to state-dependent risk behavior that does not maximize
expected payoff. In this range of dynamics, agents that are sometimes risk-
prone and sometimes risk-averse in a manner that reflects descriptive models
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of observed human decision-making are evolutionarily stable and hence prolif-
erate.
2. The demonstrations of how the principles observed in the lottery game models
affect classic cooperation games illustrates how state-dependent risk prefer-
ences under imitation dynamics can facilitate the evolution of cooperation in
situations where cooperating entails risk, increasing the likelihood of cooper-
ation emerging as the norm.
3. Incorporating societal threats identified by the social science literature into
PGG models allowed for the study of their effects on the dynamics of pun-
ishment and cooperation. Increased threat led to the evolution of increased
punishment propensities. The results from these models illuminate the evo-
lutionary basis for the wide variation in punishment propensities that exists
around the globe and provide support for a causal relationship between oth-
erwise purely correlational data between societal threat and punishment be-
havior. This helps promote cross-cultural understanding by showing how the
tightness or looseness of a society’s cultural norms is adaptive to the society’s
ecological and historical context.
In general, the work in this thesis increases understanding of human behaviors,
cultures, and their evolution, and how to model these through evolutionary game
and multi-agent system approaches. Through the identification of important factors
in cultural change and the characterization of their effects, these studies aid our
understanding of socio-cultural processes that may lead to stability, instability, or
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general normative changes in different regions, environments, or populations. This
work provides foundational knowledge likely required for predictive tools that can
aid in making decisions about where and in what ways to invest resources in order
to achieve desired societal outcomes. While the models presented are still highly
abstract, understanding the relationships presented throughout these models are an
integral part of the fundamental understanding required for more complex, detailed,




This Section presents the derivation of ∇α(RwS, Sa,b,c,d) used in Section 2.4.5.
Using Table 2.4 and Figure 2.3, one can determine the probability of each pair of
payoffs occurring and use them for the values of p(r, s) as follows:
∇α(RwS, Sa,b,c,d) =|12− 8|α(p)(apb(1− p) + apc(1− p) + (1− a)(1− d))
+ |12− 4|α(p)(a(1− p)(1− c) + (1− a)d(1− p))
+ |12− 0|α(p)(a(1− p)c(1− p))
+ |8− 4|α(p(1− p))(a(1− p)(1− c) + (1− a)d(1− p))
+ |8− 0|α(p(1− p))(a(1− p)c(1− p))
− |16− 12|αp(apbp)
− |16− 8|α(1− p)p(apbp)
− |16− 0|α(1− p)2(apbp)
− |12− 8|α(1− p)p(ap(1− b) + (1− a)dp)
− |12− 0|α(1− p)2(ap(1− b) + (1− a)dp)
− |8− 0|α(1− p)2(apb(1− p) + a(1− p)cp+ (1− a)(1− d))
− |4− 0|α(1− p)2(a(1− p)(1− c) + (1− a)d(1− p))
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Since we are considering the case where p = 0.5, we can collect terms as though
p = (1− p) (for ease of exposition we will wait to substitute 0.5 for p):
∇α(RwS, Sa,b,c,d) =|16|α(0− abp4) + |12|α(acp3 − a(1− b)p3 − (1− a)dp3)
+ (|4|αp− |8|αp2)(abp2 + acp2 + (1− a)(1− d))
+ (|8|αp+ |4|αp2 − |4|αp2)(a(1− c)p+ (1− a)dp)
+ |8|α(acp4 + abp4)
+ |4|α(0− abp3 − a(1− b)p3 − (1− a)dp3),
which yields
∇α(RwS, Sa,b,c,d) =− |16|α(abp4) + |12|α(acp3 − a(1− b)p3 − (1− a)dp3)
+|8|α(acp4 + a(1− c)p2 + (1− a)dp2
− abp4 − abp4 − acp4 − (1− a)(1− d)p2)
+|4|α(abp3 + acp3 + (1− a)(1− d)p− abp3 − a(1− b)p3 − (1− a)dp3),
which yields
∇α(RwS, Sa,b,c,d) =− |16|α(abp4) + |12|α(acp3 − a(1− b)p3 − (1− a)dp3)
+|8|α(a(1− c)p2 + (1− a)dp2 − abp4 − abp4 − (1− a)(1− d)p2)
+|4|α(acp3 + (1− a)(1− d)p− a(1− b)p3 − (1− a)dp3).
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Recollecting terms gives us
∇α(RwS, Sa,b,c,d) =(12α + 4α)acp3 + 8αa(1− c)p2
+4α(1− a)(1− d)p+ 8α(1− a)dp2
−(4α + 12α)(1− a)dp3 − 8α(1− a)(1− d)p2
−(16α + 2 ∗ 8α)abp4 − (12α + 4α)a(1− b)p3.
Substituting p = 1
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(2 ∗ 4α − 8α)(1− a)(1− d) + 1
8
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(2 ∗ 12α + 2 ∗ 4α − 2 ∗ 8α − 16α)ab.
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Basic Model evolutionary PGG of Chapter 4:
- create initial population of agents
LOOP for each generation:
# play games
LOOP NumGames times
- sample PopSize/M random disjoint sets of M agents from population
LOOP for each set of agents
- all agents in set play their type’s strategy in the PGG
- all agents in set receive payoffs from PGG
END LOOP
END LOOP
- set fitness of all agents equal to their accumulated payoff
# replicator dynamics
- create new population according to the discrete replicator dynamics
# exploration dynamics
LOOP for each agent in new population
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